When Saints Became Sinners

Massacre in the Meadow

After the original frontiersmen came the pioneers, men, women, and children who set out for the western frontier in family groups.  In some cases, these family groups included “extended” relations.  Generally, the pioneers agreed to meet at a pre-designated location near their homes or communities. Before the main body embarked on their westward journey, late comers might appear and petition the original group to join their wagon train. The idea was to have enough people form a wagon train, each of whom could defend or support one another over the long and difficult westward trail.

One of these was the Baker-Fancher Party that formed in Arkansas Ozarks in April 1857 —a consolidated effort consisting of several local origin trains.  When formed, the Baker-Fancher Train consisted of around 220 people [1], including children.  Who were these people?  Within the Baker-Fancher Party, most members were prosperous farmers with relatives and/or friends already living in California.  Others were successful cattlemen —generally successful men who had the financial resources to pull up stakes and finance the westward journey. John Twitty Baker formed his train out of Carroll County, Arkansas.  Alexander Fancher, an experienced frontiersman, formed his train from Benton County.  There were four others: Huff (Benton County), Mitchell, Dunlapp, and Prewitt (Marion County), and Poteet-Tackitt-Jones and Cameron-Miller (from Johnson County). Others may have joined the train in Missouri.

Collectively, Baker-Fancher was a well-outfitted train with solid wagons and carriages, a large herd of cattle (nearly 1,000 head), oxen, and numerous horses [2].  Some of these people California-bound farmers, others were driving cattle for profit, and some were hoping to strike it rich in the California gold fields. Their plan was to stop at Salt Lake City, Utah territory for rest and replenishment —which they did in early August 1857.  By this time, the cattle losses reduced the herd to 800 head (which was not unusual over far-distant efforts) and everyone was low on food stores and other supplies.

The timing of their cross-continental passage was unfortunate. Baker-Fancher arrived in Salt Lake City a few months after the beginning of the so-called Utah War (May 1857-July 1858). The Utah War (also known as Buchanan’s Blunder, the Mormon War, and the Mormon Rebellion) was an armed confrontation between Mormon settlers in the Utah territory and the United States military.

Brigham Young

Brigham Young

In the summer of 1847, members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (also, LDS Church, Mormons, and Mormon Pioneers) began settling in present-day Utah in the summer of 1847.  What pushed these people out of their homes in Illinois and Missouri were religious conflicts within their communities.  One of these conflicts resulted in the lynching of LDS Church founder Joseph Smith, Jr.  Subsequent leaders of the church, particularly Brigham Young (shown right), believed that isolation within the Utah territory would allow members of the church to settle in relative safety, and guarantee them the right to practice their religion as they saw fit without interference from people holding different religious beliefs. The Mormons themselves were hardly tolerant of other Christians and denounced Catholics and Protestants in equal measure.  Mormon sermons often accused non-Mormon Christians of having strayed from the true path. This, when added to the Mormon practice of plural marriage, did nothing to foster good relationships with other religious groups.

At the end of the Mexican-American War of 1848, the United States gained control of California, Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, Colorado, and Utah. Young and other LDS leaders knew that they were not leaving the political sphere of the United States by settling in Utah, nor were they interested in becoming a nation unto themselves.  They simply wanted to isolate themselves and create settlements around their own brand of theology.

The discovery of gold in California in 1846 acted as a magnet for thousands of easterners to move west; many of these trails passed through the Utah territory.  The California gold rush was a mixed blessing to Mormon settlements.  On the one hand, wagon trains brought opportunities for trade and profit; it also ended the Mormon’s short-lived vision for a utopian society based on religious isolation.

In 1849, Mormon political leaders proposed the incorporation of their territory [3] into the United States as a new state called Deseret.  They most wanted men of their own faith to govern them, rather than the governance of unsympathetic politicians appointed by the Washington establishment.  Mormon leaders wanted a theocratic government.

Plural marriage became a political issue in the United States during the mid-1800’s.  Historians tell us that in 1850, only around one-quarter of all Mormon households practiced polygamy [4] but plural marriage is what most non-Mormons thought of whenever the question of Mormonism came up.  Most Americans rejected polygamy, and for some, it was a hot-button issue.  Polygamy was immoral and against the teachings of Christ.  In 1856, one key plank in the newly formed Republican Party pledged to “prohibit” the twin evils of slavery and polygamy.

The larger issue, however, was the concept of popular sovereignty, a key component of the Compromise of 1850.  Initially, Stephen A. Douglas, a leader of the Democratic Party, was a staunch supporter of the LDS community.  He later denounced Mormonism in order to preserve the notion of popular sovereignty as it related to the issue of slavery.  Douglas was an astute politician and he, along with many other East Coast politicians (James Buchanan among them) expressed alarm by the theocratic dominance of the Utah territory under Brigham Young.  In Utah, more than a few LDS leaders received appointments to territorial and federal posts that in many ways coincided with their ecclesiastical positions, including appointments to the judiciary.  These appointments required confirmation by the territorial legislature, of course, but the legislature itself was largely composed of members of the LDS Church.

Over time, increasing numbers of Washington politicians came to believe that an LDS majority in Utah threatened the idea of American republicanism. It didn’t help allay these fears when James Strang, an LDS rival to Brigham Young, proclaimed himself a king on Beaver Island in Lake Michigan after the main body of the LDS members relocated to Utah.  There was some justification for their concerns: Brigham Young maintained his power in Utah by organizing a paramilitary organization called the Danites. Eastern politicians believed that Young kept the Mormon community in line through armed tyranny.  The evidence for this at the time seemed to be rooted in the fact that a considerable number of non-LDS settlers in Utah didn’t remain there very long.

Non-LDS federal appointees embraced the long-held position that as a federal territory, only the President of the United States (with the advice of the Senate) could appoint territorial governors and federal judges —and do so without any input from the general population.  So much for popular sovereignty, but it was a temporary measure pending successful statehood.  Presidential prerogative was a standard applied to all newly acquired US territories. Apparently, however, federal appointment became an issue within the LDS community —even to the extent of causing Mormons to stand in defiance of federal rulings.

In fear for their own safety and that of their families, some federal appointees abandoned their posts and moved back east —circumstances that fueled the notion of armed tyranny, but whether this was true, Mormon communities were in constant dispute with federal appointees and this fact led the President to conclude that the Mormons were approaching a state of rebellion against the lawful authority of the United States.  One federal judge by the name of William W. Drummond, in his letter of resignation, opined that the power wielded by Brigham Young effectively denuded the rule of law in Utah; that the Mormon leadership ignored the laws of Congress and the US Constitution, and that male Mormons acknowledged no law at all beyond the Mormon priesthood.  A Territorial Chief Justice agreed, offering specific examples where Brigham Young had perverted the judicial system in Utah.  Justice Kinney went so far to request that the president permanently assign an army regiment to the Utah territory.

Dr. John M. Bernhisel, a Mormon, served as Utah’s delegate to the US Congress.  As claims and counter-claims went back and forth between Utah and Washington, he twice suggested (1852 and 1857) that Congress convene an impartial committee to evaluate the actual conditions within the Utah territory.  In 1857, newly elected President James Buchanan was under a great deal of political pressure to do something about conditions in Utah; rather than waiting for a committee report, as suggested by Bernhisel, Buchanan decided to act.  He replaced Brigham Young as territorial governor with Alfred Cumming [5] and ordered 2,500 army troops to Utah.  The Army’s mission was to suppress armed lawlessness within the territory when ordered to do so by the new territorial governor.

Under orders from General Winfield Scott, the US Army dispatched soldiers from Fort Leavenworth, Kansas in July 1857.  Ultimately, command of these soldiers fell to Colonel Albert S. Johnson [6].  The Mormons understood that the Army was en route, but they did not have good information about its mission in Utah.  Mormon mail agents in Missouri informed Brigham Young that the US Army was “marching on the Mormons.”  This made the Mormons somewhat apprehensive and led them to begin preparations for the defense of their territory and their rights as citizens.

Whether the Mormons feared annihilation by federal troops is questionable, but what is almost a certainty is that the Mormons believed that they faced renewed persecution for their religious beliefs.  Young, fearing the worst, sent conflicting messages to Mormon communities: prepare for evacuation, stockpile food [7] and livestock, begin the local manufacture of firearms and ammunition.  He recalled LDS missionaries serving outside of the territory and dispatched George A. Smith to supervise the preparation for war among the LDS communities in southern Utah.

Forming an alliance among local Indians was another of Young’s strategies.  In late August 1857, Young met with a delegation of Indians and gave them his permission to take Mormon livestock from Utah into California [8].  He hoped to gain Indian support for an anticipated war with the US Army. Despite these efforts, Indians continued to attack Mormon settlements, including raids near Salt Lake City and along the Salmon River in the Oregon territory.  Subsequently, also in August 1857, Brigham Young activated the so-called Nauvoo Legion, a Mormon militia, which he placed under the command of Daniel H. Wells.  The force consisted of males, aged 16 to 60 years of age.  He ordered Wells to begin a series of skirmishes with approaching Army units to delay their advance.

In late August, Brigham Young declared martial law in the Utah Territory. The written declaration forbade “all armed forces of every description from coming into this Territory under any pretense, whatsoever.”  Important to the Baker-Fancher Party, Young’s order included these instructions: “…no person shall be allowed to pass or repass into, though, or from this territory without a permit from the proper officer.”

These were the circumstance in Utah when the Baker-Fancher Party arrived at Salt Lake City for rest and refit, and, consequently, the Mormons refused all hospitality and ordered Baker-Fancher to move on.  At this juncture, Baker-Fancher departed for the Old Spanish Trail which would take them south and west.  At the same time, Smith (one of the so-called LDS apostles) was traveling in company with Jacob Hamblin (Mormon president of the Santa Clara Indian Mission) and Thales Haskell.  Smith’s mission was to order Mormon settlements to stockpile their grain in the eventuality of a conflict with the US Army.  On their return trip to Salt Lake City, on 25 August, the three men camped at Corn Creek (near present-day Kanosh), not far from the Baker-Fancher party, which by this time, had traveled 165 miles from Salt Lake City.  Hamblin advised the train to continue along the trail and rest their cattle at Mountain Meadows where they would find good pasture and water. Mountain Meadows was not far from his own homestead.  Acting on Hamblin’s advice, the train moved on during the next morning.

Smith, Hamblin, and Haskell continued to Salt Lake City where Hamblin remained for about a week conducting Indian business and searching for a new plural wife.  His Indian business included a meeting with a delegation of Southern Paiute [9] and other LDS Church officials.

Haight

Isaac C. Haight

The wagon train continued 125 miles to Mountain Meadows, passing the Mormon communities at Parowan and Cedar City, led by Stake [10] Presidents William H. Dame and Isaac C. Haight. Dame and Haight were also the leaders of the regional militia.  The approach of the train prompted the Mormon communities to hold meetings.  On 6 September, the question before the town committees was how they might implement Brigham Young’s martial law order.  A plan for an “Indian attack” was discussed, but not everyone agreed that this was a proper response to Young’s order, that “no person shall be allowed to pass.”  The council resolved to take no action until Haight sent a messenger to Young asking for his advice.  The rider was James Haslam.  The trip to Salt Lake City and return would take six days.  After the council adjourned, Haight sent another rider to John D. Lee [11]; we do not know what was in Haight’s message; only that he sent one.

The Baker-Fancher Party arrived at Mountain Meadow as a somewhat dispirited lot.  They anticipated being able to remain at that location for several days to water and feed their livestock.  The next leg of their journey would take them out of Utah.  On 7 September, Mormon militia attacked the Baker-Fancher train dressed as Paiute Indians.  Baker-Fancher circled their wagons and defended themselves by digging trenches and returning fire.  Seven pioneers died during the initial assault, sixteen more received serious wounds. The attack continued for another five days.  The siege prevented members of the Baker-Fancher train from accessing water or hunting for game food.  Ammunition was soon depleted.

Over these five days, the Mormon militia leadership broke down; fear spread among the militia that some of the Baker-Fancher party had caught sight of the “white man.”  They worried that the wagon train party may have discovered who their attackers were. The militia reconciled their situation by resolving to kill everyone in the party, excepting small children.

LEE JD 002

John D. Lee

On 11 September, John D. Lee [12] and two others approached the wagon train under a flag of truce.  Dr. Lee was a federal Indian agent and a militia officer.  Lee informed the battle-weary Baker-Fancher party that he had negotiated a truce with the Paiute Indians and that the Indians would allow the wagon train to return to Cedar City under the protection of the Mormon militia.  Lee further explained that as part of this negotiation, the emigrants would have to give up their cattle and supplies to the Indians.  Baker-Fancher accepted these terms relinquished their fortification.

Mormon militia separated adult men from their women and children.  One militia man took charge of two pioneer men. Then, at a pre-arranged signal, the militia shot the male emigrants from close range.  During stage two, Mormon militia ambushed the defenseless women and children.  In total, Mormon militia murdered 120 men, women, and children.  In the aftermath of the massacre, Mormons blamed local Indians for the carnage.  Because the youngest children could not later tell what happened, the militia farmed them out for adoption by local Mormon families.  The US Army later reclaimed seventeen children and returned them to their relatives in Arkansas.

According to Mormon historians [13], James Haslam delivered his message to Brigham Young on 11 September.  Young answered that Mormon settlements must not molest the Baker-Fancher Party.  Unhappily, Haslam’s return message arrived two days too late.

Local Mormons reported that Indians stole most of the Baker-Fancher property, but this wasn’t true: Southern Utah Mormons, including Dr. Lee, seized most valuables and cattle from the slain pioneers.  Mormons sold or traded the cattle in Salt Lake City, and personal property was auctioned off to local Cedar City Mormons.

Brigham Young conducted one of the earliest investigations of the massacre. Young interviewed Dr. Lee on 29 September.  The next year, Young sent a report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs asserting that the massacre was the work of native Americans.  The Utah War delayed a federal investigation until 1859.  The primary federal investigators were Jacob Forney and Brevet Major James H. Carleton.  Carleton made a thorough investigation, uncovering forensic evidence that included human remains.  After providing a proper burial of these remains, he interviewed local Mormons and Paiute tribal chiefs.  He concluded that Southern Mormons participated in the massacre.  Carleton forwarded his report to the United States Assistant Adjutant-General; copies of the report went to members of the US Congress. Carleton labeled the killings a “heinous crime” and assigned blame to local and senior church leaders for organizing and carrying out the mass killings.

Jacob Forney, then the Superintendent of Indian Affairs for Utah, retrieved many of the surviving children of the massacred victims.  He concluded that the Paiute did not act alone, and the massacre would not have occurred without the urgings of white settlers.

John H Higbee

John H. Higbee

Federal Judge John Cradlebaugh undertook this case in March 1859; he convened a grand jury in Provo, Utah … but the jury refused to return any indictments.  Mormons refused to hold their brethren accountable.  Undeterred, Cradlebaugh conducted an inspection of the Mountain Meadows region.  A military detachment was necessary to protect him during his investigation.  The judge attempted to arrest Dr. Lee, Isaac Haight, and John Higbee (shown right), but forewarned, these men fled.  Subsequently, Cradlebaugh charged Brigham Young as an instigator to the massacre and therefore, as an accessory before the fact.

Mormon Territorial Probate Court Judge Elias Smith arrested Brigham Young under a territorial warrant.  Historians believe that Smith intended to divert any subsequent trial to a friendly Utah courtroom, but when no federal charges were filed, Smith released Young.

Phillip Klingensmith

Blacksmith Phillip Klingensmith

The American Civil War circumvented any further inquiries, but investigations continued in 1871 when prosecutors obtained an affidavit from militia member Philip Klingensmith —a church bishop and the blacksmith from Cedar City (shown right).  By this time, Klingensmith had left the church and moved to Nevada.  Subsequent to Dr. Lee’s arrest on 7 November 1874, a grand jury issued indictments on the charge of murder, naming Klingensmith, Elliot Wilden, and George Adair, Jr.  The court issued warrants for the arrest of Haight, Higbee, William C. Stewart, and Samuel Jukes —all of whom had gone into hiding.  Klingensmith avoided prosecution by agreeing to testify as a witness to the events of the Mountain Meadows massacre.

John Lee first went to trial on 23 July 1875 in Beaver, Utah.  He appeared before eight Mormons and four non-Mormon jurors.  The trial resulted in a hung jury on 5 August.  A second trial began on 13 September 1876.  The prosecution called seven Mormon witnesses who testified before an all-Mormon jury.  Lee called no witnesses and the jury found him guilty as charged.  At sentencing, the Court permitted Lee to choose the method of his own demise: hanging, firing squad, or beheading.  Lee decided on a firing squad.  Moments before his death, arranged at Mountain Meadows, Lee claimed that he was a scapegoat for others who escaped prosecution.

John D. Lee was the only Mormon convicted of the massacre. Additionally:

  • George A. Smith died in 1875, aged 58 years.
  • Jacob Hamblin died in 1885, aged 67 years.
  • Isaac Haight died in 1886 while living in Arizona.
  • John H. Higbee escaped prosecution.
  • Philip Klingensmith escaped prosecution by turning state’s evidence.
  • Brigham Young died on 29 August 1877. He suffered in death from cholera morbus and inflammation of the bowels, which may have precipitated a ruptured appendix. His pain in the final moments of his life may have been the only justice served as a result of the Mormon massacre at Mountain Meadows.

Sources:

  1. Bagley, W. Blood of the Prophets: Brigham Young and the Massacre at Mountain Meadows, University of Oklahoma Press, 2002.
  2. Krakauer, J.  Under the Banner of Heaven: A Story of Violent Faith, Doubleday, 2003.
  3. Denton, S.  American Massacre: The Tragedy at Mountain Meadows,Alfred A. Knopf., 2003.

Endnotes:

[1] The number of participants cited is an estimate because several families split off from the train, while others joined up along the way.  There is no precise number of participants in this wagon train.

[2] In this sense, it was a westward moving cattle drive, as well.

[3] The Utah territory was part of the Compromise of 1850; Brigham Young its first governor.

[4] Mormons removed polygamy from church dogma in 1890, although some people do continue its covert practice.  Whenever discovered, it becomes an instant press item with sensational headlines.  The fact is that most Islamists living in America’s inner cities also practice polygamy but receives no attention at all.

[5] Brigham Young did not know that the president had replaced him as territorial governor until Cumming arrived in Salt Lake City.

[6] Originally from Washington, Kentucky, Albert Sidney Johnson (1803-1862) served as Adjutant General and Secretary of War in the Republic of Texas.  He served as a general officer in three separate armies: Texian Army, US Army, and Confederate States Army.  He served in combat during the Black Hawk War, Texas War of Independence, Mexican-American War, Utah War, and the American Civil War.  Johnson died at the Battle of Shiloh on 6 April 1862.

[7] Stockpiling food continues to be a Mormon tradition.

[8] Mormons established colonies along the California Trail and Old Spanish Trail.

[9] Paiute Indians consisted of three separate groups of native Americans, all of which were related to the Numic group of Uto-Aztecan languages.  These were the Northern Paiute (Northeastern California, Northwestern Nevada, Eastern Oregon, and Southern Idaho), Southern Paiute (Northern Arizona, Southern Nevada, and Southwestern Utah), and Mono people (East-central California).

[10] An intermediate level in the LDS Church organization which consisted of several congregations of around 3,000 members.

[11] John Doyle Lee was born in Illinois in 1812.  When Lee was 3-years old, his mother died, and his alcoholic father became abusive. Relatives removed him from the home and put him to work on their farm.  Lee became a Mormon while still in his twenties.  In 1833, he married Agatha Ann Woolsey, the first of his nineteen wives. Lee was a member of the Mormon militia and had participated in several incidents of violence against non-Mormons. He relocated to the Utah territory in 1848.

[12] Maj. John D. Lee served the Mormon community as a constable, judge, and Indian Agent.  Having conspired in advance with his immediate commander, Isaac C. Haight, Lee led the initial assault, and falsely offered emigrants safe passage prior to their mile-long march to the field where they were massacred.

[13] John Lee told a different story.  Although he initially claimed that Young was unaware of the massacre until after it took place, he later claimed that the massacre occurred “… by the direct command of Brigham Young.”  See also: Life and Confessions of John D. Leeby his attorney, William W. Bishop (1877).

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The Origins of Zorro

Zorro 001Most people in my generation grew up reading about or watching film serials and television programs about western heroes.  We saw these heroes in such programs as The Lone Ranger, Lash Larue, The Cisco Kid, The Durango Kid, Roy Rogers, Gunsmoke, Wild Bill Hickok, Billy the Kid, Tales of Wells Fargo, and many others—including, of course, Zorro the Fox.

To young minds, Diego de la Vega (the real identity of Zorro) was how we ought to judge an actual hero.  The man was roguishly handsome, had a tool chest full of skills and talents that thrilled us.  He was a Robin Hood type outlaw, a man with a hefty price on his head, wanted “dead or alive,” but far too skilled and cunning to allow himself capture by bumbling Mexican soldiers or lawmen (in the time of the story (1769-1820), California was part of Mexico).  Sadly (or not), Zorro existed only in the imagination of his creator, author Johnston McCulley (1883-1958).

McCulley’s first account of Zorro appeared in The Curse of Capistrano (1919).  In the following year, Douglas Fairbanks portrayed Zorro in a film titled The Mark of Zorro.  In total, 15 actors played the role of Zorro.  I do not recall the Douglas Fairbanks portrayal, but I do remember the short-lived television series starring Guy Williams (real name Armando Joseph Catalano (1924-1989)) who was born in New York City, but passed away in Buenos Aires, Argentina.  Interesting stuff —made more so by the fact that I’ve discovered that there was an actual character in history that McCulley may have borrowed heavily from in the Zorro stories.  The real-life person was a combination of outlaws, one of whom was named Tiburcio Vásquez(1835-1875).

The Vasquez family arrived in Alta California [1] in the late 1700s as part of the De Anza Expedition [2]Tiburcio’s parents were José Hermenegildo Vásquez and Maria Guadalupe Cantua.  Tiburcio was well-educated, spoke several languages, and was of slight stature, growing to around 5’ 7” tall, and probably weighing around 170 pounds.  Beginning in 1852, Tiburcio fell under the influence of Anastacio Garcia, who was one of California’s more dangerous outlaws [3].  While attending a fandango in Monterey, California, Tiburcio witnessed the shooting of Monterey Constable William Hardmount by Garcia.  Frightened, Tiburcio fled the scene of the shooting, and while he was not involved in the shooting, the fact that witnesses saw him running away fueled the notion that he was a suspect in the crime.  From this time forward, Tiburcio was a wanted man; a man who operated outside the law; an outlaw.

In matters of crime, Monterey, California has hardly changed over the past 170-years.  Crime was out of control in 1850, and it remains so today.  If fighting and shooting people wasn’t enough mayhem in 1850, we can add feuding to the mix. One of these is known as the Belcher-Roach feud.  It began with two friends whose greed led them down the path of self-destruction, taking innocent people with them along the way.  Lewis F. Belcher and William Roach were both fearless in a fight; neither man would back down.  They both defined justice as an eye-for-an-eye, a tooth-for-a-tooth.

What led to their feud was their affections for the same young (and wealthy) widow.  Belcher arrived in California from New York around the age of 22-years.  Belcher acquired wealth and influence by selling meat to the American Army and Navy.  Sergeant William Roach of Company D —an immigrant from Ireland— arrived with the New York Regiment of Volunteers during the Mexican-American War.  After leaving the Army, Roach successfully ran to become the first sheriff of Monterey County.  Both Belcher and Roach relied on Tiburcio Vásquez and Anastacio Garcia as guns for hire during their murderous dispute.  Assassination and mayhem continued until the State of California executed Garcia in 1875.  Note: Today, Monterey, California is among the most crime-ridden/least safe cities in the entire nation [4].

In 1856, authorities arrested and charged Tiburcio with stealing horses.  After conviction, he received a five-year sentence at San Quinton prison.  His time in jail was productive, however; while incarcerated he planned and participated in four bloody prison-break attempts, which left twenty convicts dead in the prison yard.  After his release from prison, Tiburcio returned to a life of crimes involving burglary, cattle rustling, and highway robberies from one end of California to another.  An 1866 conviction sent him back to prison for robbing a general store in Petaluma, California.

After his second release from prison, Tiburcio organized a gang that included Juan Bautista Soto and Procopio Bustamante.  Standing over 6’ tall and weighing in excess of 200 pounds, Soto presented a terrifying figure.  He had wildly crossed-eyes, was heavily bearded, and his face badly pockmarked. Soto’s short temper made him mean and vicious.  He was also quick on his feet and fast with a gun.  Added to this, Soto hated Anglos.

Bustamante was known by several alias.  Born in Sonora, Mexico, Procopio lost his father during an Indian raid and his uncle Joaquin [5] raised him to adulthood, training him as a vaquero.  In 1862, authorities accused Procopio of murdering a local ranger near Rancho Cucamonga. There being no evidence that he murdered anyone, other than the word of a “witness,” who as it turns out was not even present during the shooting, a judged ordered Procopio released.  Deeply angered by the incident, Procopio delved deeper into outlawry.

The Vásquez gang conducted a string of bandit raids, successfully terrorizing white settlers from one end of California to the other.  In 1870, Santa Cruz lawman Robert Liddell seriously wounded Vásquez during a shootout, but despite his wounds, Vásquez escaped capture and returned to the home of his sister, who hid him and nursed him back to health.  He gained state-wide notoriety in 1873 when he held up Snyder’s Store in Tres Pinos (San Benito County).  In the process of robbing the store of $2,200, Vásquez and his gang murdered three innocent bystanders.  The incident so enraged the governor that he placed a bounty of $1,000 on Vásquez’ his head.  San Jose Sheriff John H. Adams led a posse in pursuit of Vásquez into Southern California. Another gunfight ensued, but Vásquez again evaded capture, this time hiding out with his brother Francisco near Lake Elizabeth.

Tiburcio Vasquez 001Despite these depredations, Vásquez remained popular within several Mexican communities, from Santa Rosa to Los Angeles.  There were no shortages of places to hid or people to shield him from the law.  Tiburcio was literate, handsome, and charismatic. He enjoyed dancing, playing the guitar, and fooling about with the ladies —seldom lacking company with the softer side of frontier society.  Much to the thrill of the ladies, Tiburcio was also the writer of poetry.

After several months, Vásquez returned to the San Joaquin Valley where he re-engaged in criminal activity.  After robbing the Jones Store in Fresno County, he and his gang terrorized and sacked the town of Kingston, making off with $2,500 in cash and valuables.  California’s governor increased his bounty to $15,000 and ordered Alameda County Sheriff Harry Morse track him down.  Despite this increased attention from the law, Vasquez raids continued with stagecoach robberies and murder.

On 15 April 1874, Vasquez kidnapped a prominent sheep rancher named Alessandro Repetto and held him for ransom.  Authorities organized several posse comitatus, but he always managed to escape. He hid for a time in the home of Yiorgos Caralambo at Rancho La Brea (near present-day Sunset Strip in West Hollywood).  This was a decision that led to his downfall.  While living in Caralambo’s home, Vásquez seduced and impregnated Yiorgos’ niece.  Someone connected to the Caralambo family, outraged by this behavior, notified Los Angeles County Sheriff William Rowland of the murderer’s whereabouts.  Sheriff Rowland captured Vásquez on 14 May 1874.

While in jail, Vásquez agreed to several press interviews.  He claimed to be an honorable man who simply wanted to return California to Mexican rule.  After several months, he stood trial in San Jose, California, but his pre-trial confinement period made him into a celebrity within Hispanic communities and in the Anglo press.

The Vásquez trial lasted four days; the jury deliberated for just two hours before reaching a guilty verdict.  The presiding judge ordered Tiburcio Vásquez hanged—and it might have been a rapid hanging were it not for the fact that Tiburcio filed an appeal for clemency.  Awaiting a decision, Vásquez entertained scores of visitors in his jail cell, many of these were women, and Señior Vasquez enjoyed his popularity.  He signed autographs, posed for photographs, and sold these from the window in his cell—all proceeds going directly to his attorney, of course.  Ultimately, California governor Romualdo Pacheco denied Vasquez’ request for clemency and on 19 March 1875, Tiburcio Vasquez stepped calmly into the afterlife.  He was 39-years old.

It should surprise no one that Tiburcio Vásquez remains a hero within some California Hispanic communities.  Glorifying a murderer and a thief may have been the intent of Johnson McCulley —but it is not a view that I share.  There is nothing at all romantic or heroic about Tiburcio Vasquez.  If Johnson McCulley based his character Zorro on the life and times of Tiburcio Vasquez, then Zorro can never be a heroic figure.

Sources:

  1. Yenne, B. The Legend of Zorro.  Mallard Press, 1991
  2. Curtis, S. Zorro Unmasked: The official history.  Hyperion Press, 1998

Endnotes:

[1] Also referred to as Upper California, Nueva California, California del Norte, was a province of New Spain from about 1804 (along with the peninsula of Baja California).  Alta California became part of Mexico in 1822, renamed Alta California in 1824, its territory included all present-day California, Nevada, Utah, parts of Arizona, Wyoming, Colorado, and New Mexico.  It was mostly a paper territory, however, because neither Spain or Mexico colonized the area beyond the southern and central coastal regions of modern-day California and small areas of Arizona.  There was never any effective control in California above the area of Sonoma.

[2] Juan Bautista de Anza (1736-1788) served as the 55th Governor of the Province of New Mexico (1778-1788).  When the Spanish began colonizing Alta California in 1769, Spanish authorities soon realized that they needed a more direct land route and additional colonies, particularly in the area of present-day San Francisco.  They established additional missions in the Salinas Valley.  The de Anza expedition to Alta California, which began on 8 January 1774.

[3] Apparently, few Mexicans living in California enjoyed the idea of being part of the United States after 1850.  Some of these people moved back to Mexico, others channeled their anger through banditry, and of course, there were people of Mexican heritage that adapted to the new order of politics in California after 1850.

[4] Monterey, California Crime Analytics, Neighborhood Scout Organization.  On a scale of 100 (indicating America’s safest cities), Monterey ranks 6.

[5] Juaquin Murrieta (1829-1853) was a dangerous outlaw who migrated to California in 1849.  During the California Gold Rush Murrieta formed several gangs that engaged in murder, armed robbery, and horse theft.  Johnson McCulley likely incorporated Murrieta, Bustamante, and Vásquez to form the character Zorro.

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At San Jacinto, 1836

Mexican Independence 001The Mexican War of Independence was a long and bloody affair … as well as the genesis of much internal strife after 1821.  Texas was part of Mexico, but sparsely populated with fewer than 3,500 residents and only around 200 regular soldiers to provide for their safety. Adding to the danger from hostile Indians, American filibusters complicated the lives of residents even further.  With the hope that an influx of settlers might curb Indian raids, the bankrupt Mexican government liberalized their immigration policy.  Finally, able to settle legally in Texas, thousands of Americans quickly outnumbered the Tejanos.  Most of these people migrated from the southern United States; many were slave-owners, nearly all harbored some prejudice against other races whom they regarded as inferior.  Promising to convert to Catholicism, most never did.  Protestant looked down on “papists” and generally would have nothing to do with them.

The migrants did understand that their loyalty belonged to Mexico; most took their oath of allegiance seriously —a loyalty to the Constitution of 1824, which defined Mexico as a federal republic.  Under federalism, the provinces of Mexico were autonomous; they were able to govern themselves with minimal interference from the central government.  Of course, this question of federalism vs. centralism became the source of much political upheaval in Mexico.  The Anglo settlers pledged their fealty to that Constitution. When centralists sought to suspend or ignore the Constitution of 1824, several provinces rebelled.  Initially, the vast reaches of Texas were a part of Coahuila, known as the State of Coahuila y Tejas.  Its capital was Saltillo, which was hundreds of miles away from San Antonio de Béxar.  Within the provincial legislature, however, Texas had but one representative. Tejanos were outraged about this arrangement and after much grumbling, the governor and legislature agreed to form Texas as a major department within the province.  The capital of Texas was San Antonio de Béxar.

All Anglo settlers watched the political upheaval in Mexico with some concern, most eventually reconciling themselves to continue to support the Constitution of 1824 without voicing objection to the increasingly centralized regime which was taking place under El Presidenté Anastasio Bustamante.  When the Mexican legislature abolished slavery in 1829, the Anglo settlers bridled, teetering on the verge of open revolt.  In response, Bustamante prohibited further immigration to Texas from the United States, increased taxes, and reaffirmed the ban on slavery.  Texians simply ignored the law.

Santa Anna 003

El Presidente General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna

In 1830, General Antonio López de Santa Annawas was a fence-sitter in Mexican politics.  He claimed to support federalism, a stance that won him the support of Texians, but he was simply waiting to see which way the wind was blowing.  In 1832, Santa Anna led a revolt to overthrow Bustamante; the Texians used this uprising as an excuse to take up arms.  By mid-August of that year, the Texians expelled all centralist politicians and the military from East Texas.  Encouraged by their successes, Texians held two conventions, both intending to persuade the Mexican government to repeal the Law of 1830.  By November 1833, the Mexican legislature granted concessions to the Texians, particularly in the area of immigration, and increased representation in the provincial legislature.  Despite these concessions, the Mexican government remained wary of the Texians [1].

El Presidenté General Santa Anna revealed himself as a centralist not long after seizing power from Bustamante.  In 1835, Santa Anna overturned the Constitution of 1824, dismissed state legislatures, disbanded militias, and arrested federalists.  Rebellions broke out in Oaxaca and Zacatecas; Mexicans took up arms and Santa Anna moved against them in a most-brutal fashion.  When he subdued the rebellion in Zacatecas, Santa Anna authorized his troops to sack the city; more than 2,000 Mexican civilians lost their lives.  In Coahuila y Tejas, Governor Agustin Viesca refused to dissolve the legislature, instead ordering the legislature to convene in San Antonio de Béxar.  A prominent citizen by the name of Juan Seguin raised a militia, but the city council ordered him not to interfere. Meanwhile, Santa Anna’s army arrested Viesca before he reached the safety of Texas.

Texians had a divided opinion about these events.  In the United States, editorials began advocating for independence for Texas.  A minor revolt over the issue of customs duties resulted in public meetings to determine whether most settlers favored independence, a return to federalism, or the status quo (centralism under the tyrant Santa Anna).  With few exceptions, most communities agreed to send delegates to the “Consultation” scheduled for October 1835.

Fearing an open revolt, Mexican military commander in Texas called for reinforcements as early as April 1835.  Politically, Mexico was ill-prepared for a large civil war, but continued unrest in Texas posed a greater danger to the power of Santa Anna in Mexico City.  If the citizens of Coahuila took up arms, Mexico could end up losing a large portion of its sovereign territory.  Always in the back of their minds, Mexican officials feared the intentions of the United States.  At risk were the Mexican territories of New Mexico and California. Santa Anna had no wish to tangle with the United States and the best way to ensure that this didn’t happen was to subdue any rebellion in Texas.  In September 1835, Santa Anna ordered his brother-in-law, General Martin Perfecto de Cos, to lead 500 soldiers to Texas and quell any rebellious behavior. When General Cos landed with his men at Copano Bay in late September, Texian Empresario Stephen F. Austin called all municipalities to raise militias in their self-defense.

Twenty-one settlements sent 45 delegates to the Convention of 1836, which convened on 1 March. Within one-hour of the convention’s opening, delegate George C. Childress submitted a proposed declaration of independence.  Delegates overwhelmingly passed this measure on 2 March.  Four days later, 1,800 Mexican soldiers under General Santa Anna destroyed the small garrison at the Alamo; every defender lost his life, including James Bowie, William Travis, and David Crockett.  See also: The Dickinson’s of the Alamo.

While the Texian government worked on the Constitution of the Republic of Texas, Sam Houston received an appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Texas Army. His army variously numbered 300 or less men.  David G. Burnet was elected president of Texas; on his second day in office, Burnet announced that his government was leaving Washington-on-the Brazos for Harrisburg, a city further removed from Santa Anna’s army.

After the fall of the Alamo, Santa Anna remained in San Antonio with a small force while directing his generals to destroy all Texian opposition.  Meanwhile, Mexico’s acting president, Miguel Barragán died in office. When he received this news, Santa Anna considered returning to Mexico City to solidify his position.  At the same time, he feared that General Urrea’s victories in Texas would undermine his political standing.  Santa Anna decided to remain in Texas.  In late March, Santa Anna departed Béxar to join General Ramírez y Sesma in his East Texas campaign to clean out the Texians.

On 7 April, General Sesma’s scouts captured a Texian soldier, who informed Santa Anna that the Texians planned to retreat in the face of the approaching Mexican army. Then, on 14 April a small company of Texian irregulars prevented Santa Anna from crossing the Brazos River. Frustrated, Santa Anna led his force of 700 men to try to capture the Texian government at Harrisburg, which he nearly did.  Santa Anna dispatched Colonel Juan Almonte with fifty dragoons to intercept their escape, but these officials avoided capture by taking small boats to Galveston Island.

Despite their flight, Santa Anna believed that the Texian government was in disarray and the rebellion in its final stage.  He had forced the delegates off the mainland, the government had no way of communicating with the Texian army, and most settlers had shown little interest in confronting Santa Anna’s army.  Colonel Almonte’s scouts erroneously reported that Houston’s army was en route to Lynchburg, on Buffalo Bayou.  Almonte supposed that Houston would try to join the government at Galveston.  After burning Harrisburg to the ground, Santa Anna pressed on toward Lynchburg.

On 16 April, Houston’s army came to a crossroad.  One road led north toward Nacogdoches, the other toward Harrisburg.  The Texians took the Harrisburg road, arriving there two days later —scant hours after Santa Anna’s army had departed.  On that same day, Deaf Smith and Henry Karnes captured a Mexican courier who was in possession of Santa Anna’s operation plans, his order of battle, and the location of all of Santa Anna’s subordinate commanders. Houston realized that Santa Anna force was small and not far away.  Knowing that the Mexican army was widely displaced, Houston stirred his men to battle. REMEMBER THE ALAMO.  REMEMBER GOLIAD.  Houston and his men raced to Lynchburg.

The area along Buffalo Bayou consisted of thick oak groves and marshes.  It was a terrain familiar to the Texians, less so to the Mexicans. Houston’s army of around 900 men reached Lynch’s Ferry by mid-morning on 20 April.  Santa Anna’s 700-man force arrived a few hours later.  The Texians made camp in a wooded area along the bank of the bayou; their location provided good cover and concealment from the Mexicans. It also left the Texians no room for retreat.  Houston fully realized this; an army fights harder when the only way out is forward. In contrast, Santa Anna made his camp at a vulnerable location, an open field near the San Jacinto River.  Santa Anna’s camp bordered woods on one side, a marsh and a lake on the other.  Colonel Pedro Delgado recorded in his journal that his general’s selection of encampment went against all military rules and logic.

Over several hours, both sides initiated brief skirmishes.  Throughout the night, Santa Anna worked his men to fortify their camp, creating breastworks of logs, brush, and even saddles.  By early morning, the Mexican soldiers were weary from al their work. General Cos arrived with 540 reinforcements at around 9 a.m.  Having marched throughout the night, General Cos’s men were exhausted.  They were new recruits —out of shape, ill-trained, and unfit for battle.  In any case, as the morning passed with no Texian attack, Mexican officers ordered their men to rest.  Santa Anna’s camp grew suddenly quiet.  Meanwhile, Houston ordered Deaf Smith to destroy Vince’s Bridge, six miles from camp, to prevent Santa Anna’s escape and deny any further Mexican reinforcement. At around 4 p.m., the Texians quietly began their advance through the tall grass pulling their cannon behind them. Texian artillery began firing at around 4:30 p.m.  It was the opening salvo of the Battle of San Jacinto.

After a single volley of cannon, the undisciplined Texians broke ranks and swarmed over the Mexican breastworks, engaging their enemy in hand to hand fighting.  The attack surprised the Mexicans and sent them into panic. General Santa Anna, Colonel Castrillón, and Colonel Almonte shouted contradictory commands, which confused the men further.  The only thing these soldiers knew for certain was that Texians were killing them in a fanatical assault.  Many of the Mexican soldiers threw down their weapons and shouted, “Me no Alamo,” but the Texians remembered what General Houston told them.  They remembered the Alamo; they remembered Goliad; they resolved to take no prisoners.  Other Mexican soldiers tried to escape; the Texians killed them, too.

Despite every effort of the Texian officers to stop the slaughter, the killing lasted for hours. The Texian Army, what there was of it, was out of control and there was nothing that Houston or anyone else could do to stop them.  In all, the Texians cut down more than 650 Mexican soldiers; 300 more became prisoners. Eleven Texians died; 30 others, including Houston, received wounds.

The Texians were lucky. They didn’t win this battle because they were well-disciplined troops; they won it because General Santa Anna, in his arrogance, had made tragic mistakes —the sort of things that an inexperienced junior officer might do.  Nor were the troops under Santa Anna the bulk of his army.  Four-thousand additional Mexican troops served under Generals Urrea and Vicente Filisola.  General Santa Anna also tried to escape the Texian onslaught.  He dressed himself in the uniform of a private soldier and headed toward Vince’s Bridge.  Captain Deaf Smith discovered him hiding in nearby marshes and took him to General Houston.

Houston, in great pain from a bullet wound in the ankle, listened to what Santa Anna had to say. He offered Houston peace in exchange for his life.  The Texians, however, wanted to see Santa Anna hanged.  Houston had a bigger fish to fry.  Santa Anna sent dispatches to his subordinates ordering them to return to San Antonio de Béxar.  Filisola was the next senior officer in the chain of command, and General Urrea urged him to continue the campaign.  General Filisola reckoned that Santa Anna had already caused one disaster; he did not want to create another.  The Mexican army was out of food; the rains had ruined their gunpowder; the roads were impassable; and the troops were falling ill with dysentery and malaria. Filisola also guessed that there would be no reinforcements.

Ultimately, there were two treaties, an idea proposed by Santa Anna.  Houston, Rusk, and Burnet foolishly agreed to this.   The first treaty was one designed for public dissemination of the agreements reached between Mexico and the Republic of Texas; the second treaty was private and included Santa Anna’s personal guarantees. Mexico later repudiated both agreements, claiming that a head of state serving as a prisoner of war could not speak on behalf of his country.

As the Mexican army withdrew from Texas, they took with them many Tejanos who did not want to live in the Republic of Texas (they would all change their minds in the 20th-century). They also took with them a number of slaves who preferred living free in Mexico than in bondage in Texas.  The Mexican army departed Texas in late May, but every Mexican senior officer believed that the war was far from over. The government of Mexico steadfastly refused to recognize the independent country of Texas.  In Mexico City, legislators chastised General Filisola for retreating and replaced him with General Urrea.  Within a few months, Urrea had gathered 6,000 troops to re-enter Texas.  However, internal rebellion within other Mexican states required Urrea to abandon his plan for the reconquest of Texas.

Most Texians expected a renewal of fighting.  The assumption prompted many American volunteers to join the Texas army.  There were so many volunteers that the Texas Army could not maintain records of every volunteer.  Out of caution, San Antonio de Béxar remained under martial law through the end of 1836.  For the Tejanos living there It was a heavy-handed occupation; all Tejanos in the area between Guadalupe and Nueces rivers were given this option: either move to east Texas or migrate back to Mexico.  Texas authorities forcibly removed Tejanos who refused to comply with the evacuation order.  Once they were gone, newly arrived settlers from the United States quickly took possession of these properties.  Hundreds of Tejano chose to return to Mexico.

Texas Republic 1826-1839

Republic of Texas Flag, 1836-1839

For many years after Texan independence, Mexican officials used the reconquest of Texas as an excuse for implementing new taxes and spending money on the army rather than on much-needed infrastructure. Sporadic skirmishes did occur inside Texas, but larger expeditions never took place.  The Mexican government also worried about other Mexican states pursuing similar revolutions and the purpose of Mexico’s army was to keep the people in line.

During Santa Anna’s absence from Mexico, the government deposed him, but no one in Mexico’s history had a more prolific pollical career than Antonio López de Santa Anna.  He would ascend to the presidency on several occasions; he would once more confront Anglos —this time in Mexico during the Mexican-American War (1846-1848).  Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna wouldn’t like the result of that war, either.

Sources:

  1. Calore, P. The Texas Revolution and the US-Mexican War: A concise history.  Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2014
  2. Davis, W. C. Lone Star Rising: The Revolutionary Birth of the Texas Republic.  New York: Free Press, 2004
  3. Hardin, S. L.Texian Iliad: A Military History of the Texas Revolution.  Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994

Endnote:

[1] By 1834, an estimated 30,000 Anglo colonists lived in Coahuila y Tejas, compare to less than 8,000 Tejanos.  At the end of 1835, there were 5,000 African slaves living in Texas—about thirteen percent of the non-Indian population.

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Mexican Texas

(Continued from last week)

Filibuster

Noun

An irregular military adventurer, especially one who engages in an unauthorized military expedition into a foreign country to foment or support a revolution.

Philip Nolan 001

Purported to be Philip Nolan but whether this is a true image remains in doubt as it didn’t appear in print until long after Nolan’s execution. Image extracted from the public domain.

The term filibuster derived from the old English word “freebooter,” by which Anglo-Saxons invariably described such men as Sir Henry Morgan and the various other looters of the Spanish Main.  Morgan raided the Caribbean area and plundered Panama with the flimsiest license, but since he served a national purpose, the British turned a blind eye to his activities.  After all, he was only raiding Spanish property and ships.  He wasn’t alone, of course.  There was also Sir Francis Drake, William Dampier, and Woodes Rogers.  Besides, it was a very profitable enterprise.  The freebooters weren’t supposed to raid against their own kind, of course, but it did happen.  As privateers, these men only did what their government lacked the courage to do.

The French had their own group of freebooters who ranged the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico.  They called them boucaniers.  In the 17thand early 18thcentury, French and English buccaneers were often allies.  Eventually, the word ‘freebooter’ in the French language became flibustier, and this word worked itself back into the English language as filibuster.  No matter what they were called, they all had the same purpose.

As their maritime assets were a regular target of the English and French freebooters, the Spanish had a different word to describe the filibuster or buccaneer: piratas(pirates) [1].  When the word filibusterodid come into Spanish usage, it primarily referred to Americans who engaged in insurgencies against the Spanish Crown.  The first of these was a man named Philip Nolan [2].

Nolan, an immigrant from Ireland, was an educated man who loved adventure and risk taking.  He was already well-known in Texas in 1785, where he engaged in the illegal and highly dangerous world of smuggling on the Mississippi River.  If the French permitted Anglo settlement and trade, the Governor of Texas, Manuel Muñozdid not.  Nolan was a mustanger … a man who captured wild horses in Texas and sold them to the ever-increasing population of the American south.  It might be successfully that no white man knew Texas better than Philip Nolan.  He was the first English speaking person to make an accurate map.  He was astute, as well.  In making his map, Nolan saw Spain’s weaknesses and he was overcome with the heady scent of empire.  There was something about Texas’ open space that drew Nolan in.

In 1797, Nolan presented the Baron de Carondelet, Governor of Louisiana, with a copy of his Texas map.  With much gratitude, Carondelet offered him a contract to sell horses to Louisiana.  He did this knowing that Nolan’s operations in Texas were illegal —but, as Carondelet and Muñoz were frequently at odds with one another, the legality of Nolan’s contract may not have mattered. More importantly, however, Philip Nolan entered into a secret arrangement with General James Wilkinson, who was the Senior Officer commanding the U. S. Army.  Wilkinson suggested that Nolan gather a force of reliable men and detach Texas from New Spain.  Wilkinson agreed to provide Nolan with material support.  Thus, in October 1800, Nolan returned to Texas with a party of about twenty armed Americans and a handful of personal slaves.  By the appearance of this band, it was just another mustang raid, but there was a new governor of Texas.  Juan Bautista de Elguezábal had a text-book case of phobia toward all Anglo-Americans.  History tells us, however, that Spain’s fear of Anglo encroachment was not at all an unreasonable one and it was becoming somewhat dominant within New Spain’s northern frontier.

Elguezábal was well-aware that Americans were squatting in parts of East Texas.  He issued an arrest order for all Norte Americanos whose conduct was in the least bit suspicious.  Philip Nolan was fully qualified for arrest.  The Spanish claimed to have solid evidence that Nolan planned to foment a revolution and make himself the king of Texas.  Elguezábal ordered that Nolan be “put out of the way” if he ever again returned to the Spanish frontier.

Philip Nolan met an armed Spanish patrol in East Texas but successfully faced them down.  He got as far as the Brazos River, and had already assembled several hundred head of horses, when a company of soldiers under Lieutenant Miguel Francisco Músquiztracked him down and, in the dead of night, quietly surrounded Nolan’s encampment.  A vicious attack occurred at dawn of the next morning, during which Nolan was shot and killed.

Nolan’s second in command, Peter Ellis Bean [3], took charge of the Nolan party, but outnumbered and nearly out of ammunition, Bean surrendered.  Also factoring into his decision, Bean assumed Spanish officials would return his men to the United States.  Instead, the soldiers marched them to Mexico.  What we know of Nolan’s demise comes from Músquiz’ journal: “Nolan’s negroes begged permission to bury their master’s body, which I granted after causing his ears to be cut off in order to send them to the Governor of Texas.”

Deep inside Mexico, Bean and his mean were held captive in several towns pending a royal decision about their eventual fate.  That decision finally arrived in 1807.  It ordered that every fifth man be hanged as a pirate and that the rest of the men be sentenced to ten years’ hard labor.  By this time, all but nine of the captured Americans had died from illness or other reasons.  Ultimately, only one man was hanged: Ephraim Blackburn, and except for Blackburn and Bean, the names of these other men have been lost in time.

Bean was not a model prisoner.  He was unruly, disrespectful of Spanish priests, and attempted escape on several occasions.  After one of these failed attempts his Spanish masters placed him in stocks and left him there for fifteen days.  Bean remained recalcitrant, but despite this, he received parole in Chihuahua, and he went into business as a hat-maker.  After five years of good behavior, the hapless Bean and several others attempted to escape through New Mexico.  They were recaptured and Bean was marched to Acapulco where he remained in prison until 1811.

The Mexican Revolution broke out in 1810.  When Bean learned of this in 1811, he volunteered to fight for the Crown. Spanish authority released Bean almost immediately, but he just as quickly deserted to the rebel cause, finding his way to the revolutionary General José María Teclo Morelos Pérez y Pavón(a Roman Catholic priest who replaced the executed Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla), who was then besieging Acapulco.  Bean soon rose in rank and stature among the rebels, in large part because of his knowledge of munitions.  He established several powder mills and furnaces for casting cannon.  In time, Bean convinced Morelos to send him back to the United States to win sympathy and material aid to the rebel cause.  Now a colonel, Bean was back in Louisiana by 1814. In New Orleans, Bean encountered Jean Lafitte and soon after, they offered their services to Andrew Jackson during the Battle of New Orleans.  The valiant conduct of both Lafitte and Bean gained the former a pardon for his piracy, and the latter promises for help for the Mexican insurgency.

There can be no question at this part of the narrative that the Spanish were prescient in their concerns for Anglo meddling in Spanish-Mexican affairs.

BEAN 001Meanwhile, Philip Nolan’s sponsor, General Wilkinson, was engaged in what can only be called mind boggling intrigue.  He wore the uniform of a senior American officer, but most of his efforts were for his own benefit.  Wilkinson may not have been a typical American —but he neither was he unusual in the early 1800s.  The emerging United States was short on professional officers and competent diplomats.

Peter Ellis Bean continued his engagement with Mexico.  He married a lady from a respectable family and fully intended to take her to the United States.  In 1816, however, Bean was nearly captured by royalist forces near Veracruz and he only just managed to escape back to New Orleans.  By mutual consent, his Spanish wife agreed to remain in Mexico.  Back in the United States, Bean quartered himself in the Neutral Ground [4] where he was safe from agents of Spain and the United States.  In the next year, he decided to visit his Tennessee relatives.  In 1818, perhaps thinking that his Spanish wife was dead, he married a woman by the name of Candace Midkiff.  He moved with her to Arkansas in 1820.

With news of Mexican independence, Bean moved with his family to Nacogdoches, settling near the Old San Antonio Road, with every intention of seeking a reward for his revolutionary services.  In 1825, Bean returned to Mexico, where he received a grant of land, received a commission as a colonel in the Mexican Army, and appointed as a government agent to the Cherokee Indians in East Texas.  While in Mexico, he renewed his relationship with Magdalena, but retained his home with Candace in Texas.

Nacogdoches TX 001Back in Texas, Bean was instrumental in defusing the so-called Fredonian Rebellion [5] by keeping the Cherokee neutral.  It is likely that Bean sympathized with the Texas Revolution after 1833, but as an officer of the Mexican army, he took no active part in it.  When the fighting began, he volunteered to place himself under arrest.  Initially, Sam Houston granted Bean parole, but later had him detained.  After Texas independence, Bean continued to reside in Nacogdoches until 1843.  He returned to Veracruz and his first wife. He passed away in 1847, aged 63-years. At the time of his passing, he owned considerable property in East Texas, regarded as a wealthy man, and one well thought of by the people who knew him.

As for what happened next in Mexican Texas, see The Dickinson’s of the Alamo.

Sources:

  1. Fehrenbach, T. R. Lone Star: A History of Texas and the Texans, 1968, 2000
  2. Jackson, J. Indian Agent: Peter Ellis Bean in Mexican Texas.  College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2005.
  3. Lay, B. The Lives of Ellis P. Bean.  Austin: University of Texas Press, 1960.
  4. The Handbook of Texas online.
  5. Brown, C. H. Agents of Manifest Destiny: The Lives and Times of the Filibusters.  Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980.

Endnotes:

[1] As one might expect, given the number of depredations foisted upon the Spanish by English and French buccaneers, the word in Hispanic society is revolting.  Antonio López de Santa Anna referred to the Texian rebels as pirates at the time he issued his “no quarter” order at the Battle of the Alamo and at Goliad in 1836.  Traditionally, the Spanish summarily executed pirates whenever they were captured.

[2] Writer Edward Everett Hale named Philip Nolan as the primary character in his book, “Man Without a Country.”  The story was published in The Atlantic Monthlyin December 1863.  Hale’s story was entirely fiction and had no bearing on the actual life of Philip Nolan.

[3] Bean (1783-1846) was born in Tennessee who settled in Natchez (present-day Mississippi) until joining Nolan’s filibuster to Spanish Texas.

[4] A no-man’s land between Louisiana and Texas where by agreement, neither the United States, nor Mexico exercised any control.  The Adams-Onis Treaty of 1819 finally resolved the issue of control over the Neutral Ground.  Until then, the area provided sanctuary for murderers, rapists, thieves, and brawlers.

[5] The first attempt by Anglo settlers to settle in Texas (1826-1827) and secede from Mexico.  The settlers were led by Haden Edwards, who declared the Republic of Fredonia just outside Nacogdoches.  The rebellion was short lived, resulting in the cancellation of Edwards empresarial contract.  While nearby Cherokee initially agreed to support the new republic, Bean and Stephen F. Austin convinced leading citizens to repudiate the rebellion.  In 1827, a force of one-hundred Mexican soldiers and 275 militia from the Austin colony marched into Nacogdoches and restored Mexican control over this area. The incident, while short lived, convinced Mexico to increase its military footprint in the northern frontier.

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Spanish Texas —Part V

(Continued from last week)

The Neutral Zone (also called the Neutral Ground) became a large area where neither Spain or the United States exercised any jurisdiction or control.  Within a short time, the zone became a sanctuary for the worst sort of outlaws from both sides of the border: murderers, thieves, and smugglers called it their home. In 1810, when the Mexican War of Independence broke out, violence quickly spread to Texas.  West of the Sabine River, law and order dissipated in the blink of an eye.  The neutral zone quite suddenly found itself over-populated with Mexican revolutionaries. When the lawlessness became intolerable for the United States, the government authorized the US Army to clean it up.

Augustus Magee

Believed to be the image of Augustus Magee

The Army could not have chosen a more suitable man to achieve this.  He was a lieutenant named Augustus Magee, a no-nonsense frontier officer who quickly shot, hung, or chased off outlaws and revolutionaries.  He even tied a few of the desperadoes to posts and had them unmercifully flogged.  Law and order returned to the neutral zone —for a time.  But then Magee looked across the border into Texas and saw opportunity.

Mexico in 1810 was a political mess, beset with social tension, poverty, oppression, racial antagonism, and class warfare.  It didn’t arrive at that state overnight —it was a problem with Hispanic society that had been building for two hundred years.  The oppressed in New Spain included everyone below the status of Españoles and Peninsulares.  The American and French Revolutions encouraged the oppressed and within the intelligentsia there developed a strong republican sentiment, particularly after Napoleon’s invasion of Spain in 1808.

The trouble in Spain paralyzed New Spain; the time was ripe for revolution.  Political paralysis in New Spain caused the collapse of the over-centralized Spanish political system and social structure.  A long-smoldering resentment of Hispanic society led to the formation of guerilla groups in Mexico.  One of these leaders was Bernardo Gutiérrez de Lara, a wealthy citizen of Revilla in Nuevo Santander (just south of the Rio Bravo), and an emotional republican. Lara fled to the United States to whip up sympathy for Mexico’s revolutionaries.  He established a headquarters (in exile) at Natchitoches, on the Texas-Louisiana border, and initiated a series of meetings with Augustus Magee.

Bernardo Gutirrez de Lara

Bernardo Gutiérrez de Lara

Gutiérrez convinced Magee that corrupt royalists permeated Texas and that Texas was ripe for the taking.  Magee was no idealist, but he was aware of the report filed by Zebulon Pike, who held a very low opinion of the efficiency of the Spanish army.  In time, Gutiérrez had Magee convinced that an armed filibuster into Texas could yield untold riches for men of vision and courage. Magee vacillated on the idea until the US Army passed him over for promotion to Captain.  In 1812, Magee resigned his commission and appointed himself a Colonel of the Republican Army of North Texas.  Counting Magee, the army consisted of one person —so he set about recruiting men to join it.

Magee and Gutiérrez planned an invasion of Texas.  Gutiérrez would command the army (for political reasons) with Colonel Magee and his army doing the wet work.  Gutiérrez set about flooding Texas with flyers soliciting able young men to serve in the army.  Magee went to New Orleans to recruit men, successfully raising a remarkable collection of drifters, borderers, idealists, and “men of good family.”  Some of these men of good family were the same desperadoes he had driven out of the Neutral Ground.  A few Indians joined the mix.  Most of his American soldiers of fortune passionately believed that Texas rightfully belonged to the United States —as did Louisiana, and almost everyone opposed the tyranny of the Spanish King.  They were adventurers, of course, but they thought the adventure was for a good cause —and if not that, it was good for them.

Magee paid them $40.00 a month and promised a league of Texas soil (back then a league was a measure of distance that a man could walk in one hour).  Magee’s 800-man army had a multi-national flavor: Americans, Louisiana-French, Mexican rebels, and disaffected Indians.  They crossed into Nacogdoches in August 1812 and the Spanish guardia did exactly what Pike had predicted: they made a hasty retreat. Although Gutiérrez appointed himself general commanding, Magee was in charge, and most of Magee’s officers were Americans.  The Army marched south to La Bahia (Goliad).  Waiting to receive them was Governor Salcedo and 1,500 Spanish troops of Presidio La Bahia.  Magee bypassed the waiting soldiery and launched a surprise attack against the Presidio.  In doing so, Magee captured all the presidio’s stores and munitions. When Governor Salcedo began his siege of the presidio (lasting four months) Magee didn’t mind because they were well protected and had enough food, water, and artillery.

During the siege, in early February, Magee died.  Some historians opine that he killed himself; others suggest that he contracted malaria. The papers preserved by Mirabeau Lamar suggest that his men poisoned Magee in retribution for his harsh treatment of them during the cleanup of the Neutral Zone.  It is more likely that Magee succumbed to disease; if not malaria, then something else in a vast inventory of Texas diseases.

Magee’s deputy was a man named Samuel Kemper [1].  He assumed the title of colonel and took command of the American volunteers. Salcedo, who was desperate for a solution to this problem ordered an attack.  Kemper’s artillery created heavy casualties to the Spanish, and, in March 1813, Governor Salcedo retreated northwest toward San Antonio de Béxar.

Kemper example 001

To my knowledge there is no picture or recorded likeness of Sam Kemper. This could have been the kind of clothing he wore, however.

The news of this “victory” spread across Louisiana and transformed the American volunteers into heroes fighting for Texas liberty.  It was a great recruiting tool and dozens of young men (including James Wilkinson’s son) flocked into Texas to join the fun.  Reinforced, Kemper pursued Salcedo to San Antonio.  In another sharp battle, Kemper forced the Spanish garrison at the Alamo to surrender.  Governor Salcedo gave up 1,200 men, and Kemper took possession of San Antonio. After rewarding his soldiers, Kemper released all prisoners, and on 6 April 1813, issued a declaration of independence of the State of Texas.  Colonel Kemper and his principal officer, one Major Lockett, kept the troops under control.  Kemper wanted to discuss Texas joining the United States, but Gutierrez dismissed that idea; instead, he wanted full control of the Army, reminded Kemper that he and his adventurers were on Mexican soil.

Gutiérrez, in consultation with his Mexican staff, devised a constitution reflecting Mexican liberalism; a construct that formed a governorship and junta closely resembling the structure of the Spanish Crown.  The document envisioned no elections, no consultation with the people, and a structure where loyal revolutionaries filled all major positions. It was no different than government in every other Hispanicized country.  One provision stunned Kemper: that the State of Texas would be part of the Mexican Republic, to which it would remain inviolably joined.  Since Gutiérrez de Lara and all his principal associates were Mexican, Kemper should not have been surprised.  And then Lara’s reprisals began when he sent assassins to track down Governor Salcedo and murder him along the road outside San Antonio.  When Kemper and men learned of the murder, they promptly returned to the United States in disgust.  General Simón Herrera and twelve other Spanish officers accompanied them.  A few American cutthroats remained behind and formed a coalition under Henry Perry and José Álvarez de Toledo.  Toledo was an aristocrat and idealist in the same mold as Gutiérrez. The Republican Army of the North thus became an army of freebooters.

Jose Arredondo

José Joaquín de Arredondo

As events unfolded, the pure Spanish Toledo remained aloof from his men and did not earn their trust.  Perry, however, was a more down-to-earth fellow and able to marshal his men to defeat the Spanish General Elizondo, whose orders were to destroy the rebellion. Elizondo’s trouncing prompted the response of yet another Spanish Army, this one led by José Joaquín de Arredondo —an extremely competent commander. Upon arriving near San Antonio, Arredondo incorporated the remnants of Elizondo’s force and established a base camp fifteen miles south of Béxar.  His arrival caused a great deal of excitement within the revolutionary camp: Toledo insisted on taking full command; Perry’s Americans refused to obey Toledo’s orders. Toledo wanted to establish a defensive position along the Medina River and force Arredondo to come to him, but Perry (foolishly) argued in favor of crossing the river and attacking Arredondo’s flank.

This is what in fact transpired, but Arredondo an accomplished general officer, anticipated such a move.  When the rebels charged, Arredondo had several of his companies fall back, as if in disarray, and this prompted the Americans to charge after them. Arredondo’s force then established a V-shaped formation and fired upon the Americans from both sides.  Toledo rallied his Mexicans and Indians and called a retreat; the Americans refused to run.  As a result, 850-Americans died, but not before inflicting extremely heavy losses among Arredondo’s 2,000 men.  Ninety-three Americans, including Perry, survived.  Both he and Toledo fled back to Louisiana.  Toledo eventually reaffirmed his allegiance to the Spanish Crown and served as Spanish Ambassador to the Court of Naples.

As for the rest of Toledo’s revolutionaries, Arredondo tracked them down, arrested, and then executed them —giving no quarter.  This wouldn’t be the last time a Mexican general ordered the massacre of prisoners of war.  In San Antonio, Arredondo then turned on the local citizens, arresting over 300 for aiding the revolution and executed them, as well.  After this, General Arredondo began his march to Nacogdoches sending advance word to all that he intended to kill every Anglo he found on Spanish soil. Hundreds of Anglos fled into Louisiana. At the end of Arredondo’s punitive expedition, hardly anyone remained in Texas.  In fact, he was so efficient that when he finished executing people, there was no one left capable of filling any government post in San Antonio de Béxar.

General Simón Herrera (1751-1813), a former governor of both Nuevo Leon and Texas, and a republican, escaped to Galveston Island with a few colleagues, later joined there by Colonel Perry.  Together, they organized a miniaturized Republic of Mexico.  Then, enlisting the aid of a few sea captains, they began a campaign against Spanish commerce as privateers.  Initially, this illegal venture was successful, and they were able to seize several wealthy Spanish ships.  Their success didn’t last long, however, and for two reasons: First, some of their sea captains began attacking other than Spanish vessels, and second, Herrera and Perry involved themselves in the slave trade —which brought them to the notice of the emerging US Navy.  The US Navy’s mission back then was two-fold: stop piracy and put an end to the slave trade.  In 1817, Herrera and Perry wisely relocated their republic to the central American coast. At this point, Perry could count his remaining days on one hand and we will hear no more about him in the history of Spanish Texas.

Portrait of Pirate Jean Lafitte

Jean Lafitte

Following the demise of Herrera and Perry, a new buccaneer took over at Galveston Island: Jean Lafitte.  His first claim to fame occurred in 1807 when he became known for a rather robust smuggling operation along the Louisiana coast.  Lafitte became a legend in his own time and today it is difficult to separate fact from myth.  What we do know about Lafitte is that he harbored a deep hatred for Spaniards. Hounded by various authorities of the US government, Lafitte went into hiding for a spell, soon revived by the British.

In 1814, the British were planning to invade Louisiana and seize the mouth of the Mississippi River from the United States.  They appealed to Lafitte for aid, promising him British citizenship, command of a Royal Navy frigate with the rank of post Captain, and £30,000 to make war against the US.  Lafitte always maintained that while he frequently broke the laws of the United States, he was always a loyal American.  He sent documentary proof of the British offer to the Governor of Louisiana offering instead to assist the United States in any way possible.  The governor was overjoyed to receive this news and because of his patriotism, New Orleans society welcomed him.

After assisting Andrew Jackson at the Battle of New Orleans, Lafitte received a Presidential pardon for all his previous transgressions. Meanwhile, because Lafitte’s business dealings had suffered over several years, and inspired by General Herrera, Lafitte secured letters of marque [2] from the rebel regime now operating from Venezuela to sail against Spanish shipping.  Lafitte moved to Galveston Island in 1817 and within a few months, had assembled a thousand men to help him with his enterprise.  To strengthen the legality of his position, he established “The Republic of Mexico” at his pirate colony, which he named Campeche.  Lafitte required all those serving him to take an oath of allegiance to the republic; he prohibited them from attacking any vessel of the United States.  He ordered his captains to confine their piracy to Spanish shipping, and while not every one of Lafitte’s captains followed those rules, Lafitte did considerable damage to Spanish merchantmen during this period.

The succession of filibusters, freebooters, buccaneers, and pirates operating from the United States did nothing to ease tensions between the United States and Spain.  Officially, the United States maintained its claim to Texas and each time a group of American adventurers crossed over into Texas, the more convinced the Spanish were that the United States was up to no good. History assures us, however, that the US government did not conspire against Spain; it was only that the activities of individually motivated freebooters (such as Wilkinson, Magee, and Lafitte) made it look that way.  Spain politely disbelieved Washington’s assurances that it had little control over these filibusters.  In 1819, the United States agreed to purchase Florida. As part of that treaty, the Neutral Ground became part of Louisiana territory and the US abandoned all its claims to Texas.

It was also in 1819 when the well-connected Dr. James Long, from Natchez, Mississippi, organized an expedition, “to invade Texas and establish a Republic.”  Long was married to the niece of General James Wilkinson and owing to his distinguished service during the Battle of New Orleans, became one of Andrew Jackson’s favorites.  Elected to command the expedition, Dr. Long, his bride and infant in tow, led 80-men toward Nacogdoches, Texas.  By the time Long reached the Texas border, his force had swelled to three hundred —among them the old revolutionary, Bernardo Gutiérrez de Lara.  At the time, Nacogdoches was nearly deserted, so it did not take these men long to capture the town.  Following a convention of the participants, Long, as president, declared Texas a free and independent republic.  Long then sent detachments of men to establish posts on the Brazos and Trinity rivers.

In September, Long set out for Galveston Island to seek the assistance from Jean Lafitte.  En route, Long learned that a Spanish army was marching to East Texas from Béxar.  He ordered Mrs. Long to take their child into Louisiana and his officers to merge their forces.  Then he hurried to Galveston Island where Lafitte refused to involve himself in the filibuster.  Jean Lafitte [3] schooled Long that without a large, well-disciplined army, he could not succeed against the Spanish army.  A disappointed president returned to Nacogdoches only to learn about the defeat of his army, the death of his brother, and that some number of his settlers were then in Spanish captivity.  As the town itself was nearly empty, Long re-joined his wife in the United States.  He might have learned an important lesson from this near-catastrophic experience, but Long had developed a psychosis: delusions of grandeur.  With new supporters and financiers in New Orleans, Long formed a partnership with the republican Felix Trespalacios.

Calling themselves the Patriot Army, Long and Trespalacios led an expedition by sea to the Texas coast in 1820.  Mrs. Long again accompanied her husband, now with another small child.  At Bolivar Point [4], Long and Trespalacios constructed a small fortification to serve as their base of operations and then sailed to Mexico to foment rebellion.

Dr. Long led some men to La Bahia and, as before, the town quickly fell to the American invaders. The victory was short-lived because royalists quickly surrounded Long, and he had no choice but to surrender. Dr. Long might have immediately faced execution were it not for the fact that Mexico was in a state of political instability; several high-ranking royalists were beginning to accept the notion of Mexican independence.  After several delays, Spanish troops escorted Long to Mexico City where, by the time of Long’s arrival, Spain’s royal government had fallen, and Agustín de Iturbide had proclaimed himself Emperor of Mexico.  Soon after, Iturbide appointed Trespalacios Governor of Texas.

The government in Mexico City did not know what to do about Dr. Long.  Was he a republican hero, or an American pirate?  In the end, Trespalacios ordered Long shot as a pirate. After Long’s death, his men returned to the United States leaving the 21-year-old Mrs. Long and her two children (and a Negro attendant) at Bolivar Point.

Part of the price the United States paid for Florida was to renounce its claim to Texas.  After Spain and the United States signed their treaty, President Madison prohibited Americans from entering Spanish territory. A presidential order may not have made much difference to the lone frontiersman, or even a small family seeking a place for themselves in the western territories —and in fact, Mexican independence from Spain rendered moot any need for future filibusters designed to “liberate” Mexico from Spain.

The Mexican war for independence raged for over eleven years.  Small but lethal military expeditions and conflicts between royalists and republicans had a disastrous impact on the province of Tejas.  The war for independence reversed Spain’s progress (if you could call it that) over the previous 100 years.  General Arredondo executed or exiled over a thousand people —at the time, approximately one-third of the population of Spanish-Texas.  Dr. Long’s expeditions caused royalist officers to drive away settlers, and much of the improved farmlands surrounding Béxar reverted to their natural state.  As a result of this, people in Texas faced starvation —even those living in San Antonio de Béxar.  At this time, the greatest problem in Texas was under-population.  In 1811, there were between thirty to forty-thousand Indians in the American southwest, and fewer than 4,000 Europeans.  After two decades of hostility and confusion, the bloodshed in Texas was far from over.

(Continued next week)

Sources:

  1. Burkholder, M. A. Spanish Empire, Encyclopedia of Latin-American History and Culture, 1996
  2. Thomas, H. Rivers of Gold: The Rise of the Spanish Empire, Columbus to Magellan, New York: Random House, 2003
  3. Maltby, W. The Rise and Fall of the Spanish Empire, London: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2009
  4. Valencia-Himmerich, R. and Joseph P. Sanchez. The Encomiendas of New Spain, 1521-1555: Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991
  5. McKendrick, M. Spain: A History, New York: Horizon Books, Electronic Edition
  6. Phillips, Jr., W. D., and Carla R. Phillips. A Concise History of Spain (Second Edition): Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 2016
  7. Fehrenbach, T. R.Lone Star: A History of Texas and the Texans from Prehistory to the Present: Austin, Da Pao Press, 1968, 2000
  8. Liss, P. K. Mexico Under Spain: Society and the Origins of Nationality, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975

Endnotes:

[1] Historians believe that Kemper was born in Fauquier County, Virginia.  He and his brothers Reuben and Nathan fought in the 1804 rebellion against Spanish authority in West Florida.  Losing confidence in Mexican leadership, Kemper decided to withdraw his support and returned to the United States.  He died of malaria at St. Francisville, Louisiana in 1814.

[2] A letter of marque (and reprisal) was a license issued to a privateer to attack and capture sea vessels who were at war with the issuer of the letter.

[3] Historians believe that Jean Lafitte received mortal wounds while engaged off the coast of Honduras in 1823 and was buried at sea.

[4] Located on the Bolivar Peninsula in present-day Galveston County, Texas where the Gulf intercoastal waterway enters Galveston Bay.

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Spanish Texas —Part IV

(Continued from Last Week)

In 1806, the only towns in Texas were San Antonio (about 2,000 inhabitants), Goliad (1,400 people), and Nacogdoches (nearly 500 residents).  Despite the dangers that constantly threatened them, several American families with good reputations settled near Nacogdoches.  These, along with the officers of the Mexican army stationed there, formed the higher circles of society.  Elaborate dinner-parties were abundant, at which the conversation was bright and sparkling, and the toasts and speeches were witty and eloquent.  Toasts were always offered to the King of Spain and the President of the United States.

Spanish Army 1800

Spanish Army officers

Living in San Antonio were the descendants of aristocratic Spanish families.  As they often came from the Vice-regal Court in Mexico City, Spanish army officers were generally men with polished manners and the priests were men of learning and refinement.  The governor hosted frequent receptions and each night on the public square, the people met to promenade, dance, and converse.  After visiting San Antonio in 1806-07, American explorer Zebulon Pike reported it as being one of the most delightful places in the Spanish colonies.

Spanish officials inside Mexico did not reciprocate this “good feeling.” For many, the notion of a graceless and aggressive white race helping themselves to the continent was disturbing. There was, of course, historic antagonism between Spain and the English, rooted in the collapse of the Middle Ages. The feeling among American frontiersman was that Spain represented tyranny of the worst sort, which also included popery.  Among the Spaniards, these American explorers were despicable piratas.  The Anglo-Saxon mob (in Spanish, Anglosajón) were at best ill-mannered sloths, and at worst, rapists and thieves.

When France’s dream of a vast North American empire crumbled, Spain inherited all French settlements along the Mississippi River.  The Spanish standard flew over New Orleans; Spanish cannon protected the river from interlopers.  About twenty-thousand Europeans lived within this Empire — all of them within the Louisiana Territory.  Most of those people were French-Canadian.  Ten-thousand Spanish speaking people did not guarantee Spanish power, however.  Spain did not have the military footprint to display Imperial power, and Spanish leadership (for the most part) was either inattentive or incompetent —although both could be true.  Spanish title to Louisiana was a legal fact, but history doesn’t depend on who owns title to such lands.  What matters is the people who populate it because ultimately it is the population that controls the land.

Francisco Domingo Joseph Bouligny y Paret

Francisco Domingo Joseph Bouligny y Paret

One exception to the above generalization was Francisco Domingo Joseph Bouligny y Paret.  He served as a high-ranking officer in Spanish Louisiana, as lieutenant governor under Bernardo de Gálvez in the late 1700s, and it was he that first proposed the settlement of Spanish and other Catholic immigrants throughout Louisiana as a means of bolstering Spain’s claim to these territories.  His idea included Anglo-Americans willing to switch their allegiance to Spain.  It was a dangerous proposal, of course, but how else could Spain increase its population and control in such a large area?  Bouligny wasn’t pulling feathers out of the air; he’d observed the settlement of Kentucky and reasoned that if English-speaking settlers dominated Upper Louisiana, then the Americans would eventually take over the entire territory.

Bouligny was a wise man; if he had ever seen an early map of the thirteen American states, he would note that the largest of these existed in the southern half of the United States, and that they began on the Atlantic coast and extended linearly across the entire North American landmass.  Thinking outside the box, Bouligny wanted to bring Anglo-settlements west of the Mississippi under the flag of Spain.  He was certain that if he could induce the Americans through liberal grants of land, the only real cost to these settlers would be their loyalty to Spain.  Besides, the homogeneity of the Spanish Empire had already been affected by the incorporation of thousands of French-Canadians.

Bouligny proposed that Spain offer English-speaking Roman Catholics [1] land grants.  When you think about it, the proposal made perfect sense from the Spanish point of view.  There was only one problem: there were no Roman Catholic settlers in the Mississippi River Valley.  Not only that, but of the total of Catholics living in the United States (numbering about 30,000) none were much interested in becoming frontiersmen. When this reality finally registered, Bouligny went even further.  He proposed that immigration should be opened to “any individual, whatever his nation, especially if he comes with his family and his negroes.”  He ignored the religious test entirely.  Governor Gálvez could not make the laws, but he could ignore them —which is what he did— and smart man that he was, he never put anything in writing.  Governor Gálvez wasn’t a trouble-maker; he was a free thinker.  This could cause Gálvez problems, of course, so he always walked softly when dealing with the Viceroyalty of New Spain.  Gálvez wasn’t the only free thinker.  Some of these high-ranking Spaniards were also Freemasons.

When war broke out between Great Britain and its American colonies, people who wanted to get out of the way began streaming across the Mississippi River.  Most of these people were Tories.  The Spanish military left them alone.  In 1779, Governor Gálvez paid the Anglo settlers an official visit.  When it became readily apparent that Great Britain had lost its war with the colonies, most of these people took the oath of allegiance to the King of Spain.  In 1783, Gálvez obtained a Royal edict that granted these Tories the right to remain within the Spanish Empire.  Many of these Tories did stay, and men such as Gálvez created pluralistic societies in places where one would least expect to find them: Spanish settlements.

Esteban Rodríguez Miró y Sabater

Esteban Rodríguez Miró y Sabater

Gálvez’s successor was Esteban Rodríguez Miró y Sabater and by 1787, Miro was pursuing two courses of action. The Spanish minister in Philadelphia had the authority to recruit Anglo-Americans for the Missouri [2] country.  United States Army Major General James Wilkinson was on the Spanish payroll to help separate the western settlements from the United States of America. Wilkinson, having secretly offered his oath of allegiance to Spain, attempted to foment a war between Virginia and Kentucky.  Of these two strategies, Spanish recruitment for Missouri was the most successful.

Colonel William Morgan of New Jersey, an Empresario, contracted with Spain to settle several American families at the mouth of the Ohio, at a town called New Madrid.  The Spanish offered lucrative deals, including enormous acreages of land, to responsible men who could recruit settlers and were willing to establish a colony at their own expense.  Spain also rewarded the families that accompanied them with leagues of land —and under far better terms than they could ever receive in the United States.  There were other advantages to Missouri, too.  There were no hostile Indians —long dead by virtue of warfare, smallpox, and venereal disease.  Thousands of Americans moved to Missouri.  All these people agreed to become Roman Catholic, but it was mostly an empty promise.  No official ever questioned them about their religion.  Religion aside, they all became citizens of Spain.

In 1789, Governor Miró faced a dilemma.  The Inquisition had sent a priest named Sadella to investigate a rumor that Governor Miró had offered citizenship to protestants.  After Sadella’s arrival in New Orleans, Miró had him arrested and deported, pretending that he did not know who Sadella was, or what he represented. To head off the Inquisition’s further inquiry, Miró wrote to the King, saying “His Majesty ordered me to foster an increase in the population, admitting inhabitants from the Ohio country. These people were invited with the promise they would never be molested —the mere mention of the name of the Inquisition would stop all immigration and cause those already here to depart.”

Contrasting with Hispanic settlements in Mexico, Anglo-American settlements in the Missouri country were prosperous. Trade was brisk between New Madrid and Pittsburgh and other trading posts on the Ohio River.  Aside from an occasional clash of culture, there was no real trouble between Anglos and Hispanics.  The issue of religion was carefully avoided.  Spanish Customs officers had even come to terms with the Anglo trader: they either took their cut (in Spanish, Mordida), or they turned their backs.

Thus, a handful of enlightened officials were able to create a free society, comparable to that of the United States, within the tyrannical Spanish Empire at a place called Missouri.  There is no question about the success of these efforts: Missouri was filling up with Spanish subjects who spoke English.  Colonel Morgan (and others like him) were Spanish officials who exercised vast powers over their colonies.  Spanish authorities expected the empresarios to govern as hidalgos.  Morgan wisely let the town of New Madrid run itself, but this concerned Governor Miró, who had no faith in the proposition that mere peasants could govern their own affairs.

Despite its successes, the Spanish-Mississippi Empire was not to be —and for two reasons.  First, the United States was able to hold on to its western settlements in Kentucky, and through the device of statehood fostered a remarkably robust economy.  Spain could close the Mississippi River, of course, but in doing that, Spain would risk a war with the United States.  Second, in 1800, Napoleon, First Consul of the French Republic, his ambitions blocked in Egypt, re-imagined a grand French-American Empire.  Napoleon forced the King of Spain to cede Louisiana in exchange for some obscure Italian real estate —and at the ceremony where the transfer was made legal and binding, Napoleon promised that the French would never alienate Louisiana or let it fall into the hands of an English-speaking power.  Napoleon many talents, of course.  As a politician, he was able to look someone in the eye and tell him convincing lies.  In 1803, Napoleon sold the Louisiana Territory to the United States.

Thus, Spain’s experiment with pluralism ended quite abruptly.  It wasn’t a failure of pluralism —only a matter of circumstances and royal prerogatives.  The policies of Gálvez, Bouligny, and Miró were great successes —everyone thought so.  These ideas would later influence Spain in another province: Texas.  Clear-thinking men of the Spanish aristocracy had set an important precedent.

One of the Spanish Missourians was a Connecticut Yankee by the name of Moses Austin.  He and his son, Stephen would become empresarios in Texas.  They would bring the first Anglo-Saxon settlers to Spanish Texas, but for now, at the beginning of the 19th century, westward moving settlers achieved opportunities as never before.  Anglo settlers pushed hostile Indians out of Illinois and into northwest Ohio.  Kentucky had transformed itself from a backwater into a prosperous state. Georgia acquired title to all former Indian lands, and the only Indians in Tennessee were friendly toward whites. These circumstances encouragd the westward migration of thousands of settlers.

Was this all part of America’s Manifest Destiny?  The answer will vary according to whom you ask.  In 1803, most Americans weren’t conquering much of anything beyond the next day.  If they were pursuing American Imperialism, it was no more than folk-imperialism. The move west was by and large an individual endeavor; governments only provided the environment through which citizens could make their own way.  Pioneers couldn’t have purchased the Louisiana Territory; President Jefferson could. Once he did, then it was up to the frontier men and women to make a success of it.  Individualism was the essence of the American spirit.

American Frontiersman

The American Frontiersman

A few years later, another Spanish territory was placed on the menu: Florida —also secured through diplomacy.  The Americans had tasted territorial expansion and liked the flavor of it.  Did they think of themselves a superior to everyone else on the continent?  Of this, there can be no doubt.  Fighting didn’t matter —winning the fight did.  People lacking self-confidence do not willingly go in harm’s way.  Were the frontiersmen belligerent?  Without a doubt —these were men capable of taking adequate measure of themselves, men who refused to take “no” for an answer, and —when combined with an absolute hatred of the old world— belligerence was the result of an abundance of self-confidence.

The year was 1800 and the Spanish were well-acquainted with acts of piracy —and abhorred them.  They viewed trouble-makers from the United States as pirates.  One of these was a man named Philip Nolan, who was not an American.  Nolan was born in 1771 in Ireland.  While still a young man, he found his way to Spanish Louisiana and into the employ of James Wilkinson.  Between 1788 – 1791, Nolan served as General Wilkinson’s secretary and bookkeeper.  In Natchez, he became acquainted with Manuel Gayoso de Lemos, governor of the Natchez district. Using Wilkinson’s influence, Nolan obtained a trade passport from Governor Miró and set out to establish a mutually beneficial relationship with native Americans west of the Mississippi.  We are told that Nolan lived with the Indians for about two years.  What may have alienated him toward Spanish Mexico was that his authorization to trade among the Indians was void in Texas, prompting authorities there to confiscate all his goods.  When Nolan finally returned to Louisiana, he took with him fifty horses that he’d captured on the Texas plain.  Nolan quickly realized that there was good money in selling horseflesh, so “mustanging” became his new area of concentration.

Philip Nolan 001

Purported to be Philip Nolan

In 1796, the 25-year-old Nolan began working for Andrew Ellicott, a US Boundary Commissioner who was mapping the Missouri River.  When the survey party arrived in Natchez, Gayoso was not pleased to learn that Nolan had aligned himself with the Americans.  In his youth, Nolan may not have realized the degree to which the Spanish distrusted America’s interest in Spanish territory. When confronted by the irate Gayoso Nolan explained himself sufficiently to earn a third trade passport. Subsequently, Gayoso changed his mind and wrote to the Viceroy of New Spain warning him about the presence of foreigners, such as Nolan, who (Gayoso believed) were stirring up the Indians against Spanish settlements.

Nolan departed from Natchez with a wagon train of trade goods, which he successfully transported to Béxar in 1797.  While in San Antonio, Nolan ingratiated himself into Spanish society. Not everyone was impressed. Commandante-General Pedro de Nava received instructions from the Viceroy to “deal with” Nolan.  Provincial governor Muñoz protected Nolan by issuing him “safe conduct” out of Texas.  When Nolan returned to Natchez, he took with him more than 1,200 horses from Texas [3].

By this time, Nolan realized that he’d worn out his welcome in Spanish Texas, but he also knew that trade (legal or otherwise) was profitable.  He organized an expedition of thirty frontiersmen to accompany him back to Texas, ostensibly to obtain more horses.  There are conflicting accounts of this expedition. Some historians claim that Nolan induced the frontiersmen to follow him by promising enough land to make them kings. What makes this doubtful is that the men who became frontiersmen hated kings with a passion and would never have wanted to emulate one.  My own guess is that Nolan simply told these men that Texas would make them rich.  In any case, the Nolan expedition crossed into Texas in October 1800, intending to  capture horses in the area north of Nacogdoches. When the Spanish authorities became aware of the expedition, de Nava ordered their arrest.

On 21 March 1801, a Spanish force of around 120-men departed Nacogdoches to find and arrest Nolan.  They located him in the Texas hill country.  Several of Nolan’s men surrendered to the Spanish without incident.  Nolan, who was not willing to surrender, died from gunshot wounds.  This prompted the rest of his men to yield to Spanish authority.  What we know of this event comes from the journal of Ellis P. Bean, who served as the expedition’s second in command.  We today believe that Nolan was the first of the American filibusters —sort of [4].

The United States’ purchase of the Louisiana Territory in 1803 no doubt stunned the Spanish, but I imagine they high-fived each other when they learned that the new military commander of the Department of Louisiana was none other than Major General James Wilkinson.  After all, Wilkinson had been on the Spanish payroll for many years. While Wilkinson advised American politicians to support the separation of Texas from New Spain, he provided Spain with useful (insider) information about what was going on inside the US capital.

Louisiana PurchaseNevertheless, the Louisiana Purchase presented a delicate situation.  Initially, the Spanish refused to evacuate their holdings. When they finally did agree to evacuate, they were once more shocked to learn that the United States had not only purchased Louisiana, but everything north and east of the Rio Grande, as well. Those clever French, having reasserted their old claim to Texas, sold Texas to the United States —and conveniently forgot to mention this to the Spanish crown.

Spain, long wary of US intentions toward Texas, was now convinced that no American was trustworthy.  The feeling created extreme tension on the US-Spanish border.  This too was awkward because there was never a survey of the border area between Texas and Louisiana.  In fact, the border area was actually a gentlemen’s agreement between France and Spain —and the Spaniards knew full well that there would be no such agreement with the Americans.  Spain responded by dispatching armed troops to the Spanish side of the Sabine River.

Still unaware that General Wilkinson was a Spanish secret agent, the United States authorized him to negotiate with the Spanish over the Louisiana-Texas border.  While talks were underway, Wilkinson sent Zebulon Pike to survey New Mexico. General Wilkinson was too clever by far. He alerted the British about a possible US invasion of New Spain and when the British seemed interested, he informed the Spanish that the British were plotting against them.  Spain was overjoyed to have such a man as Wilkinson in their employ.  They increased his payments.  This was about the time that Wilkinson brought in the Vice President of the United States to help him with his Texas land scheme —and, as it turned out, Aaron Burr was the ideal candidate for Wilkinson’s conspiracy because he had the kind of personality (and reputation) that suited Wilkinson’s schemes.  Burr was full of himself, greedy, and one of the least popular politicians in Washington.

MajGen James Wilkinson

James Wilkinson

Modern historians believe that all General Wilkinson’s intrigues had but one purpose: to frighten Spain into paying him more money.  Whether true, Wilkinson became a very wealthy man.  By informing Madrid what Burr was up to, and how he had personally worked to defeat Burr’s plot [5], an ever-grateful Spanish Crown paid Wilkinson his weight in gold.  In 1806, before leaving his post in Louisiana to testify against Burr, Wilkinson met with General Herrera, Commanding Spanish forces in East Texas.  Wilkinson suggested that two gentlemen should be able to cordially settle the border issue and agreed to accept a neutral zone between the Sabine River and Arroyo Hondo —a small tributary of the Red River. The effect of this agreement moved the US border seven miles further east … a clear win for the Spanish, which means that it was a clear win for Wilkinson, and besides that, Wilkinson knew full well that President Jefferson did not want a war with Spain.  The President commended Wilkinson for his foresight and initiative.

(Continued next week)

Sources:

  1. Burkholder, M. A.Spanish Empire, Encyclopedia of Latin-American History and Culture, 1996
  2. Thomas, H. Rivers of Gold: The Rise of the Spanish Empire, Columbus to Magellan, New York: Random House, 2003
  3. Maltby, W. The Rise and Fall of the Spanish Empire, London: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2009
  4. Valencia-Himmerich, R. and Joseph P. Sanchez. The Encomiendas of New Spain, 1521-1555: Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991
  5. McKendrick, M. Spain: A History, New York: Horizon Books, Electronic Edition
  6. Phillips, Jr., W. D., and Carla R. Phillips. A Concise History of Spain (Second Edition): Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 2016
  7. Fehrenbach, T. R. Lone Star: A History of Texas and the Texans from Prehistory to the Present: Austin, Da Pao Press, 1968, 2000
  8. Liss, P. K.Mexico Under Spain: Society and the Origins of Nationality, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975

Endnotes:

[1] Spanish law required all of its subjects to be Roman Catholic and recognized no other religion.

[2] One of these was a man by the name of Moses Austin.

[3] Nolan’s information about Texas was helpful to Wilkinson in his development a map of the Texas-Louisiana frontier in 1804.

[4] The Spanish word Piratas evolves from “freebooter,” also “filibuster.”  It refers to an irregular military adventurer, particularly one who engages in unauthorized military expeditions into a foreign country to foment or support a revolution.  In French, the English word filibuster translates to Buccaneer.  In Spanish, the French word Buccaneer translates to pirate.  There have been several American filibusters who went to Spanish Mexico to cause trouble, and while Nolan may have been the first, I see little evidence that he went to Spanish Texas to foment rebellion.

[5] The so-called Burr conspiracy involved a treasonous cabal of wealthy land speculators who intended to seize land, create an independent country and appoint Aaron Burr to lead it.  In fact, the individual who roped Burr into this crazy episode was James Wilkinson and Burr was his patsy.  It was Wilkinson who led Jefferson to accuse Burr of treason.

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Spanish Texas —Part III

(Continued from last week)

In sixty years, the population of San Antonio de Béxar grew to around 1,700 people; only 400 of these were Spanish (loosely interpreted) with the rest being mestizos, Indians, and mulattos [1] (in Spanish, Culebras).  Mulattos outnumbered mestizos.  Over time, the word mestizo came to mean a Hispanicized Indian regardless of social origin, although the main distinction was in the language spoken and the way they dressed.

San Antonio 1820

San Antonio c. 1820

By the late 1700s, San Antonio de Béxar was an area of wretched shanties with only a few good buildings. Officially, the people of Spain’s northern-most frontier received little sympathy.  The Commandant General of the Interior reported that the settlers of Villa de San Fernando lived miserable lives because they were lazy, uneducated, and lacked professional skills.  There were no doctors or lawyers.

Spanish officials soon visited San Antonio de Béxar … which had become the capital of Spanish Texas.  Few of these inspectors had much good to say about it.  The average citizen lived a meager existence.  The people ate, but not well … which was the result of their apathy toward work and their sense of entitlement.  Modern historians claim fascination by the internal decay of Hispanic society, but for the life of me, I don’t understand why.  The situation as it existed in San Antonio in 1750 continues to exist in most Hispanic societies today, including parts of Mexicanized Texas, Mexico, and every Spanish-speaking country south of Mexico.  It also exists in modern-day Spain.  All these societies share clerically influenced societies, rigid caste systems, economic ineptitude, a determination by the elite to maintain their status at the expense of everyone else, and incompetent centrally-managed governments.

Texas in 1700 was not a contiguous province of New Spain and perhaps would never have been were it not for the threat of French encroachments that drove Spain into creating settlements on its northern frontier —settlements that were separated from Spain’s nearest civilized centers by several hundred miles through treacherous desert.  San Antonio was, indeed, an oasis … but even after Texas’ independence from Mexico, San Antonio de Béxar remained relatively unpopulated —even through the beginning of the 20th century.  In 1750, Spain’s northern colonies were significantly isolated from each other.  Culturally, the Spanish were ill-equipped to establish viable economies at these widely dispersed locations [2].

But there was a more important reason for Spain’s failure to hold Texas: the Spanish Empire committed suicide —a process that began when the Spanish introduced the horse into Apache culture (the Apachería) and through them, to the Comanche.  In so doing, Spain created the most fearsome light cavalry the world has ever known (See also: The Comanche).

The Spaniards never solved their Indian problem in Texas.  If anything, the difficulty grew worse over many years. Eventually, every Spanish settler from New Mexico to East Texas lived in stark fear for their lives from both the Apache and Comanche.  The Indians effectively stunted Spanish settlement as literally hundreds of colonists were killed in the north and thousands more along the fringes of Old Mexico. Indian war parties sortied as far south as Jalisco by the mid-18th century.  The number of horses and cattle stolen numbered in the hundreds of thousands —true even though by 1720 the Spanish had more armed men stationed in Texas than they had employed in the conquest of Mexico and Peru, which until Spain’s arrival, were empires containing tens of millions of natives.

Could the Spanish Crown admit that twenty or thirty thousand horsed Indians could shred the power of his Empire?  Of course not.  But it was not a matter of Spain being unaware of the likely effect of its policies. Far-seeing Spanish intellectuals provided the King with a clear warning: the frontier was not advancing, and in fact, it had already begun to recede.

In 1766, the Marqués de Rubí implored the Crown to accept the distinction between its mythical frontier and the stark reality.  As we have seen, the Presidio-Mission concept failed. The system could only be employed among subservient Indians —there were none of those in Texas — and rather than forging native people into a strong Hispanic base as full partners, they enslaved, tortured, and killed those who were best able to defend the land. Spain’s success in Mexico and Peru came as the result of its ability to conquer the dominant people, tribes of natives that had already subjugated all others.  After providing the Apache and Comanche with horses, there was no way that Spain could then suppress these dominant tribes.  In fact, the opposite was true: it gave them the greatest defeat ever suffered at the hands of Indians in the New World.

The Comanche made their presence known in San Antonio de Béxar soon after it was founded, but the first real trouble with hostiles came from the Apache, who were being systematically pushed off the plains by the more aggressive Comanche into the area of present-day Southern New Mexico, Arizona, and central and west Texas.  The Apache began hounding the Coahuiltecan tribes, which may have been their motivation for accepting life in Spanish missions.  In 1730, a large band of Lipan Apache attacked the settlement at San Antonio killing two soldiers, wounding thirteen others, and stealing sixty head of cattle.  The raid prompted Spain to organize a punitive expedition, which was their standard reaction to Indian raids.

Commandante Bustillo y Cevallos surprised an Indian camp west of San Antonio, likely along the San Sabá River (a branch of the Colorado).  The attack resulted in the death of many warriors, women and children.  Cevallos claimed that he killed two-hundred Indians, but Spanish officials regarded this as an exaggeration.  The expedition had no effect on the hostile Apache, however. A party of Lipan Apache subsequently appeared in San Antonio demanding to speak with the brown-robes (friars); they would have nothing to do with the soldiers.  What they wanted was a mission in their own country, in the area of the San Sabá River.  They claimed to want peaceful relations with the Spaniards.

Diego Ortiz de Parrilla 001

Colonel Diego Ortiz de Parrilla

The padres rejoiced and gave thanks to God; the soldiers rolled their eyes and advised caution. However, nothing could dampen the enthusiasm of these priests and, in a few years, Spanish authorities granted permission for the construction of a new Presidio and Mission in Apache country. It would be named San Luís de las Amarillas.  In April 1757, Colonel Diego Ortiz de Parrilla led his men and five priests from San Antonio and began construction of the new edifice in the heart of Apache country, known as the Apachería.  The mission was constructed of logs; it was surrounded by a palisade.  The Presidio was constructed a few miles away.  The Parrilla expedition had three tasks: (1) convert the Lipan Apache, thereby removing them as a threat to the safety of Spanish citizens; (2) extend Spanish power and influence into the region west of San Antonio, and (3) investigate claims of vast silver resources along the San Sabá River. Coronado was not the last man to believe in mythical treasures.

While the Apache had appeared meek enough in San Antonio, in their own country they were dismissive of Spanish soldiers and priests.  There was no time for conversion; it was the hunting season.  After hunting season, there were other excuses —and yet the padres persisted. But something was amiss: The Apache seemed fidgety, and the Spanish couldn’t figure out why.

In fact, the Apache did have something up their sleeve.  Having been mauled by the Cevallos expedition and shredded by the terrible force of Comanche in the north, the Apache intended to set both enemies upon each other.  They had not only lured the Spanish into the Apachería, but also beyond the border of Comanche country, the Comanchería.  The Apache eagerly awaited the Comanche reaction to the presence of these foreigners.

The Presidio-Mission had only been finished for a few months when a friendly Indian brought word to the padres of a terrible calamity in the offing. Anxious, the Spanish sent word to the entire frontier, warning everyone of impending Indian attacks —but nothing happened.  Summer and fall passed without incident; everyone relaxed.  It must have been a false rumor.  These things happened on the great plain.  Winter passed, and with the approach of spring, the grass turned green and lush.  It was a perfect environment to forage thousands of horses on the great plain.  It was early March 1758.  The night brought a full moon and no one in the garrison had ever seen such nocturnal beauty.  This was a period known as the Comanche Moon —a time when large parties of mounted Comanche could ride at night, unseen by anyone for a thousand miles.

Then, quite suddenly, every Lipan Apache in the area disappeared.  No one saw an Indian for days, until one morning a rush of horsemen swooped down upon the Presidio.  Sixty head of horse were abruptly gone from the Spanish pasture.  Parrilla put all his men on the walls; he dispatched a messenger asking that the padres join him at once.  They refused.  After a few days, when nothing else happened, Parrilla went to the mission and argued with the priests.  They must, for their own safety, move to the Presidio.  The senior priest, Father Terreros finally agreed to join Parrilla the next day even though it was unlikely that “invisible Indians” would wish to do the padres any harm.   Colonel Parrilla detailed seventeen soldiers to remain with the priests and provide them with protective escort the next day.

The Comanche attacked the next morning during mass.  Soldiers ran to the parapet to take up firing positions; Father Terreros and Father Molina followed them.  What they observed was around 2,000 Comanche horsemen surrounding the mission.  Molina was terribly frightened and said as much, but Terreros insisted that these men must be friendly as no Spaniard had done them any harm.  The soldiers awaited the priest’s order to fire, but Terreros would not or could not command it.

Comanche Warrior 001

The Comanche attacked the next morning during mass.

The Comanche warriors were wearing war paint of black and red; they wore headgear of buffalo horn, deer antlers, and eagle’s plumes. All were armed with lances and bows; five score carried French made muskets.  One Comanche dismounted and walked to the mission’s main entrance. He pushed against the doorway and found it open.  Terreros hesitated, but the Indian did not.  He shoved the door open and quite suddenly, the mission was filled with Comanche Indians.  In sign language, the Comanche ordered the priest to send a message to Colonel Parrilla telling him to open his Presidio to the Comanche.  A large party of Indians took the hand-written message and rode off.  Meanwhile, another Indian, someone other than a Comanche, had fled to the Presidio to inform Parrilla of these events.  The colonel immediately ordered a detachment of troops to reinforce the mission. These men mounted and rode off —directly into the war party coming from the mission with Toreros’ message.  The Spanish cavalry never had a chance.  In mere seconds, every soldier was killed, save one, who, though badly wounded was able to crawl away.  The hostiles scalped every dead Spaniard.

At the mission, the Indians had no interest in the offer of gifts; they would take what they wanted.  As the looting started, Spanish priests gathered in the center of the enclosure —but not for long.  Spanish troops inside the mission were the first to die.  One priest was lanced and then decapitated.  Several Comanche grabbed Terreros and carried him off with the intent of torturing him, but a Comanche arrow pierced his skull and he died instantly. Molina was able to break away and together with a few others, hide inside one of the sleeping rooms.  They remained there for several hours.  When the looting and killing was done, the Comanche set fire to the mission and departed as quickly as they had arrived. Molina was saved by the fact that the mission was constructed of green wood; it would not burn.  After dark, the wounded Molina led a handful of survivors to the Presidio.

Three days later, after Colonel Parrilla’s scouts reported that the Comanche horde had left the area, Parrilla and Molina returned to San Sabá where they gave Terreros and others a Christian burial.  Afterwards, Parrilla gathered his force and withdrew to San Luís and asked for reinforcements.

The destruction of San Sabá caused consternation and rage at San Antonio de Béxar.  Spanish and ecclesiastical authorities strongly believed that the desecration of the mission and murder of priests should not go unpunished, but nothing was done. After the San Sabá presidio was raided again in 1758, Spanish officials called a conference at San Antonio.  This time, they were serious: they planned an expedition.  All call went out to all other presidios in Texas for soldier reinforcements.  A large number of friendly Indians were raised to augment the military.  The Viceroy eventually approved the plan.

In August 1759, Colonel Parrilla led six-hundred men with orders to sweep the Indian country north of Béxar.  About a third of his force were Lipan Apache.  He carried two field artillery guns and a supply train to sustain his force for an extended period.  It was the greatest Spanish military expedition ever mounted in Texas. Colonel Parrilla commanded more men than Coronado and Pizarro combined, but he would not march his men into the heart of Comanche country.  To do so would have placed his force at the mercy of a superior mounted force.  He instead skirted the Comanchería.  He never met any of the Comanche, but he did locate a Tonkawa village.  At this point, one of two things must become apparent: either the Spanish were intent upon revenge for the death of Father Terreros, or Parrilla didn’t know one Indian from another.  Parrilla attacked the Tonkawa village, killed 55 Indian men and seized more than 150 women and children.  These he ordered marched to San Antonio.

In October 1759, Parrilla approached the Red River, the northernmost boundary of Texas.  Here he found more hostiles: Comanche, Wichita, and several others.  At the moment he ordered his attack, the Lipan Apache deserted and ran for their lives.  Colonel Parrilla fought his way out of an encirclement, and while his losses were comparatively small (discounting the Indians who ran away), he lost both of his field cannon and the supply train.  It was the worst defeat by the Spanish military in the New World [3].

Within a few weeks, Colonel Parrilla reappeared at Béxar.  Spanish casualties aside, Spanish power was dealt an enormous psychological blow.  In Mexico City, Colonel Parrilla faced a court-martial [4].  Twenty years later, a French agent working on behalf of the Spanish Viceroy recovered Parrilla’s cannon.  Never again did the Spanish authorize a church mission for hostile tribes in the Texas interior.  Never again did Spain mount a serious campaign against the Comanche.

Colonel Parrilla’s campaign marked an important shift in the balance of power in Texas.  From 1759 onward, the Spanish adopted a defensive strategy when it came to hostile Indians.  Lipan Apache continued to terrorize frontier communities, the Comanche began to raid and plunder deep inside Mexico, and the Spanish presidios became targets of opportunity and sources of great entertainment for the plains Indian. Spanish soldiers wisely refused to pursue attacking war parties.

The Spanish had established several missions and settlements in East Texas near the Louisiana border, a few crumbling missions and forts along the south Texas crescent, and, of course, inside the Texas capital at San Antonio de Béxar.  Outside of these efforts, the Spanish expressed no further interest in settling Texas until 1820, when they opened the land to Anglo-American settlement.

What the Texas Indians learned from the Spanish was how easy it was to defeat them; from the Texians (Anglo settlers), the hostiles learned about death and pain.  After the Anglo-Americans arrived in Texas, hostile Indians no longer enjoyed the privilege of sanctuary.  It was true that the Indians could ride far and fast; true that they were lethal instruments of terror on the plains, but it is equally true that they met their match in the men and women who became Texans.

Mission San Antonio de Valero (at San Antonio de Béxar) was secularized in 1793.  After 75-years of effort, there were but 43-settled converts to Christianity —and none in any of the remaining missions.  In 1800, the total population of Spanish Texas was less than 3,000 souls (including Indians and garrison troops).  After three-quarters of a century, after the death and suffering of thousands of men and women on the Spanish-Mexican frontier, after losses of tens of thousands of cattle and horses during unrelenting warfare, the small number of people remaining in San Antonio cursed the Church and Crown with equal vigor.

(Continued next week)

Sources:

  1. Burkholder, M. A.Spanish Empire, Encyclopedia of Latin-American History and Culture, 1996
  2. Thomas, H. Rivers of Gold: The Rise of the Spanish Empire, Columbus to Magellan, New York: Random House, 2003
  3. Maltby, W. The Rise and Fall of the Spanish Empire, London: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2009
  4. Valencia-Himmerich, R. and Joseph P. Sanchez. The Encomiendas of New Spain, 1521-1555: Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991
  5. McKendrick, M. Spain: A History, New York: Horizon Books, Electronic Edition
  6. Phillips, Jr., W. D., and Carla R. Phillips. A Concise History of Spain (Second Edition): Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 2016
  7. Fehrenbach, T. R. Lone Star: A History of Texas and the Texans from Prehistory to the Present: Austin, Da Pao Press, 1968, 2000
  8. Liss, P. K.Mexico Under Spain: Society and the Origins of Nationality, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975

Endnotes:

[1] The definition of a mulatto is someone with one white and one black parent.  Since there were no Negroes on the Texas frontier, the term Culebra more than likely describes someone with a white parent and one who is non-white classification.  This is an illustration of the complexity of the Spanish system of social classification.

[2] Modern historians point to the fact that only a forest-farm oriented race could have nurtured the thickets and hills of Texas.  The Spanish were a Mediterranean race who thought in terms of colonial centers constructed in the Roman pattern —none of which were ever economically viable.

[3] Colonel Parrilla reported that he fought 6,000 warriors who presented themselves under a French flag; he opined that French military officers likely commanded them. Historians discount Parrilla’s claim; there may have been French agents among the Indians, but there was no evidence produced by Parrilla of a French military operation, nor has there ever been any evidence of a direct participation in the Indian alliance by the French.  Historians claim that it is more likely that Parrilla exaggerated the numbers of Indians to place his defeat in a better light.  Defeat at the hands of other European armies was one thing; defeat by savages quite another.

[4] Colonel Parrilla’s court-martial didn’t terminate his career.  A few years later Parrilla achieved the rank of Brigadier with a post of some distinction in his native Spain.

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Spanish Texas —Part II

In 1718, the Spaniards situated their new mission midway between the East Texas presidios and the “way-station” mission at San Antonio de Valero near the San Antonio River —150 miles northeast of Coahuila. This was Tonkawa territory [1].  At first, the San Antonio mission was unimportant —serving as no more than a backup to the main effort further east.  The Spaniards sited two additional missions near the coastal end at Rosario and Refugio.

In planning these missions, the Spanish considered the native populations surrounding them. Only one of these missions survived, however, and none achieved their primary directive: to reduce Indian culture and increase Spanish power.  The Tonkawa refused to accept Christianity much less Spanish serfdom —and why should they? Meanwhile, the French were busy displaying their skills in providing insight to the Indians as to what the Spanish had in store for them —and one thing more: the Tonkawa had the power to resist.  The French sold the Indians firearms.

The fact of French traders circulating among native populations infuriated the Spanish, whose policy it was to deny firearms to Indians.  Still, the Spanish were powerless to do anything about the French, and St. Denis continued to exercise his considerable influence over the Hasinai, which kept them from adopting Spanish ways.  So effective were St. Denis’ policies that even years after his demise, French traders continued to maintain them.  Meanwhile, measles, smallpox, and other European diseases took a heavy toll on the natives.  By the middle of the eighteenth-century, the Caddo Hasinai were in rapid decline; in another 50 years, they had almost completely disappeared —unwittingly killed by those who came to save their souls.

Tonkawa 001

The Tonkawa consumed their enemies.

Mission San Antonio de Valero never attracted any Indians at all.  The Tonkawa adopted a policy of ignoring the Spanish.  In order to utilize Indians for labor, Spanish friars had to import them from Coahuila, but these were a lazy lot and their spirit already broken. They would stay and work for as long as there were gifts —and when fed— but even when they had received their food and gifts, they often melted away —or died.  In the southeast, the Karankawa also concluded that the Spanish were bad medicine.  They too fled back into the coastal marshes.  They sent clear messages to the Spaniards by killing them at every opportunity. They too avoided European settlements.

It is true that Spanish settlements took hold near Nacogdoches, but these were based on a small number of Spanish/Mexican settlers who constructed small, struggling communities. Without Hispanicized Indians, Spanish missions could not flourish and more to the point, Spain’s refusal to establish legitimate trade with their French neighbors stunted economic growth and forced the missions to depend on New Spain for resupply.  What the Spanish wanted, of course, was the best of all possible worlds; a purely Hispanic province in Texas, from which all profit accrued to their own interests, never once realizing that a robust trade with French settlements would foster an interest in colonial adventurism and increase their profits.

Mission San Antonio de Valero 1785In the same year that the Spanish founded Mission San Antonio de Valero, the French established the settlement of New Orleans.  San Antonio had a distinct advantage over the other missions: its location.  San Antonio was closest to New Spain and situated near a flowing river. Approaching the settlement from the south, San Antonia was an oasis appearing out of a bleak desert.  The area offered abundant irrigation water, rich pasture land, plentiful building stone, and access to useable timber.  San Antonio, situated just below the Balcones Escarpment, had a mild, dry, healthful climate, with pleasant winters and bearable summers —and because San Antonio was not unlike the climate of Spain, its location was attractive to Spain’s priests and soldiers.  Moreover, San Antonio did not have to (regularly) contend with hostile Indians.

Spain’s decision to construct San Antonio de Valero was no accident.  St. Denis stopped there with his Spanish cohorts, noting in his journal that it was an ideal place for a settlement.  Initially, the Spanish intended the mission as a way-station between New Spain and the East Texas missions that St. Denis also inspired. The friars who established Mission Valero were Franciscans who had served at several locations in northern Mexico before the Marqués dispatched them across the Rio Bravo del Norte [2] into Texas.  When the Franciscans arrived, they brought with them a considerable number of Coahuiltecan, giving them the advantage of having a pool of incorporated Indians to perform labor and who were able to communicate to others the benefits of the Spanish-Indian life style.

Juchereau St. Denis 001

Juchereau St. Denis

In the aftermath of St. Denis’ arrest and escape from Mexico in 1721, Marqués Valero strengthened San Antonio by incorporating it into the province of Coahuila.  He sent 54 soldiers to construct a strong presidio, named San Antonio de Béxar (also Béjar) after the Duke of Béjar, a brother of the Marqués de Valero (killed while fighting against the Turks).  Even though the construction of the fort was incomplete, energetic friars finished a series of stone missions along the river.

Initially, the Spanish contingent consisted of friars, soldiers, and four (4) settlers.  By 1726, the settlement had a non-population of two hundred men, women, and children.  As for the Indians from Mexico, they demonstrated no great interest in performing labor.  But what occurred in San Antonio after 1718 is vital to understanding the history of Spanish/Mexican Texas.  It illustrates all the virtues and inherent faults of Spain’s colonial efforts in North America.

Spanish religious orders had hundreds of years of experiences working alongside the Spanish military.  Consequently, when the Franciscans of San Antonio de Valero requested a Spanish garrison, they made it very clear they wanted a qualified contingent.  The friars wanted men of pure Spanish race, possessing high moral character, and married.  To avoid more “mixed blood” on the frontier, they wanted the families of these men to accompany them.  The settlers, too, must be of high character for otherwise they might have a bad effect on efforts to Christianize local populations.

I can only imagine the look on the face of the Marqués de Valero when he received these demands. How would it be possible to create a garrison of men wholly comprised of saints?  Even if that were possible, all Mexican soldiery was mercenary —men who became soldiers in order to escape a worse fate.  As with the Romans 1,500 years earlier, the Spaniards learned that employing mercenaries resulted in the loss of martial devotion found among gentleman warriors.  Over time, “gutter Spanish” and “so-called Spaniards” replaced the noble fighters. As a result, military discipline in the Spanish army was considerably worse than within other European armies.  The conquistadores had always been an undisciplined lot, but they made up for this through their military fanaticism.  By this time, however, disciplinarians like Coronado were long dead.

Franciscan FriarsThe Franciscans of San Antonio de Valero were not at all pleased by the quality of the garrison they finally received from Mexico City. Half of the soldiers arrived unmarried. Most of those who were married left their families in Mexico and none of the soldiers were “pure blood” Spaniards. Worse, the soldiers fell into one of three categories: half-breeds, outlaws, or no-accounts.  The friars responded to this affront by keeping their Indians away from soldiers, even to the point of refusing to allow mission Indians to serve the soldiers.  This was the reason construction of the presidio was unfinished.  The relationship between military and mission deteriorated further when the friars isolated Indian women away from the soldiery.

Neither was there any harmony between the church and its flock: the Coahuiltecan, while not resistant to conversion, was an unwilling worker.  These Indians required an inordinate amount of supervision from the friars, who had other things to do.  Indians didn’t understand the point of disciplined work.  In Indian culture, life was simple: in fat years, everyone eats; in lean years, everyone starves.  In any case, the Indians exhibited no ambition, no “joy in their work,” and this frustrated the high-energy friars.

But there was something more going on among the Indians.  They too began dying from European diseases.  Their birthrates decreased.  Completely overwhelmed by Spanish civilization, the Coahuiltecan became a broken people.  With their old ways destroyed, they became completely apathetic to life in the Spanish mission system.  Their choices were these: work to death, become a fugitive, or die at the hands of hostile Apache.  Death was the only escape these Indians had.

By 1750, the Spanish had constructed five missions in the San Antonio area.  And, while each of these employed around two hundred Indians, there was never a second generation of mission Indians.  Each of the friar’s successive ten-year plans failed.  At no time did any Church official re-think what they were doing.  Some of the best minds of the Spanish Empire investigated the situation in Texas and concluded that the missionary effort was failing.  Despite this, the Church’s influence prevailed.  The one consistency of the Church throughout this period was its steadfast refusal to accept reality.  Rather than facing up to the effects of incorporation, they instead blamed the Indians.  This trend became an important symptom of the decline of Hispanic society.

The Spanish settlers requested by the Franciscans finally arrived in 1731.  It was a group of ten families, among them five newly-weds. They arrived from the Canary Islands —fifty-six Spaniards in all, subsidized by the Crown.  Historians believe they were people exiled to the Canary Islands from Spain because they were political radicals.  It was life in those barren islands that may have induced them to volunteer for the Texas frontier —at a time when almost every Spanish civilian in Mexico declined to go to Texas.

In addition to generous financial subsidies, the King was pleased to honor them with the status of hidalgo [3] (Fijo d’Algo), translated from old Spanish meaning the son of someone important. The designation was a genuine title of breeding, held by him and his descendants in perpetuity.  It was a measure of how desperate the Crown was to settle the frontier.  It was also a huge mistake.

Among Spaniards, birthright is a serious issue and probably taken far more seriously than anywhere else in Europe.  The Canary Islanders took their new titles completely to heart.  Being a hidalgo in Spain, or even New Spain, offered social advantages.  Importantly, this designation separated its recipients from the working class, but on the Texas frontier it ended up being a ridiculous situation.  Men of dignity did not perform common labor, but that is precisely why the Viceroy sent them to Texas to begin with.

The islanders arrived in the San Antonio region expecting to find a town, and a deferential population over which they might serve as part of the elite.  Instead they found no town; it was up to them to build one, plant crops, provide food to the missions, and accomplish all these things without the benefit of Indian labor.  They arrived as a privileged class totally without funds only to find that there was no one to support them.  In effect, the islanders became indentured servants and none of them liked it.  One of these men signed his name as follows:

Juan Leal Goraz, Spaniard and Noble Settler by order of His Majesty (Whom God Guard) in this Royal Presidio of San Antonio de Béjar and the Villa of San Fernando, Province of Texas, and present Senior Regidor of the said villa, also a farmer.

Unfortunately for the colony, Goraz and the others viewed their function in the same way. They performed no labor.  Instead of carving a flourishing community out of the wilderness, the hidalgos went native.  They became hunters, fishers, loafers, and in some cases, smugglers and thieves.  It was possible to raise a few beans without much effort, and Spanish cattle were omnipresent in the fields around Béxar.  The Spanish hidalgos could eat without great difficulty while enjoying the splendid climate amid beautiful scenery.

The two-sided conflict between missionaries and soldiers now became a three-sided war. The islanders wrote bitter letters to the Viceroy protesting the fact that the missionaries monopolized the best land, isolated Indians from performing labor, and allowed their cattle to roam untended.  The friars wrote letters, too.  They described the hidalgos as indolent and given to vice, unworthy of the blessings of the new land.  Neither were the Franciscans happy that the King had wasted 80,000 pesos to move the hidalgo to San Antonio; he ought to have given that money to the Church.

The battle continued as the settlers became spies for the viceroy in Mexico City: they reported that the friars weren’t getting anywhere with the Indians.  They wondered if someone might investigate what was going on within the missions.  The situation was bad enough that the hidalgos even demanded their own parish church and their own priest.

The concerns of the settlers were well-founded.  A few Indians became sufficiently Hispanicized to take up a life like that of the elite.  Over time, the friars forced more than a few soldiers to wed Indian women who were with child —and the mestizo community began growing.

The fact that the hidalgos married within their own circle soon resulted in cleavages in society. It was all part of the intricate class and caste of Spanish society.  Spaniards born in the old country outranked everyone else, even though they too ranked according to birth and station.  Next came criollos (also, creoles) of pure race who had the misfortune of birth within the colonies.  Below the Spanish elite was a complex range of mixed blood people, some classified as Spanish, but not treated as such.  Indians placed at the bottom of this complicated hierarchy.  Such designations may hardly have mattered in Mexico City, but systemic discrimination became a large issue in the small settlement of San Antonio de Béxar.  It was an isolated community in New Spain, a socially divided settlement prohibited from trading with French Louisiana by royal decree, an enterprise denied access to a labor pool needed to expand agricultural production.

The gem of Spanish Texas floundered.

(Continued next week)

Sources:

  1. Burkholder, M. A. Spanish Empire, Encyclopedia of Latin-American History and Culture, 1996
  2. Thomas, H. Rivers of Gold: The Rise of the Spanish Empire, Columbus to Magellan, New York: Random House, 2003
  3. Maltby, W. The Rise and Fall of the Spanish Empire, London: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2009
  4. Valencia-Himmerich, R. and Joseph P. Sanchez. The Encomiendas of New Spain, 1521-1555: Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991
  5. McKendrick, M. Spain: A History, New York: Horizon Books, Electronic Edition
  6. Phillips, Jr., W. D., and Carla R. Phillips. A Concise History of Spain (Second Edition): Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 2016
  7. Fehrenbach, T. R.Lone Star: A History of Texas and the Texans from Prehistory to the Present: Austin, Da Pao Press, 1968, 2000
  8. Liss, P. K. Mexico Under Spain: Society and the Origins of Nationality, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975

Endnotes:

[1] Owing to their practice of cannibalism, the Tonkawa Indians were repugnant to both early settlers and other Indian tribes.

[2] In the United States, Rio Grande.

[3] The term may offer an interesting perspective to Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla, the priest who became known as the “father of Mexican Independence.”

Posted in History | 2 Comments

Spanish America

History is only valuable when presented in its unblemished condition. If presented in any other way, which is to say, watered down to placate the sensitivities of one group or another, then important lessons of history go unheeded, resulting in repeated mistakes. Besides this, actual history is far more interesting than its revised version. Raw history is neither unkind nor judgmental; it is simply what happened; its relevance becomes obvious when we connect it to subsequent events.

I have provided some background to Spanish Texas and the American Southwest in earlier posts, but nothing substantial.  The history of Spanish America is the story of empire, subjugation, rebellion, and independence.  History involves real people —some bad, some good— who made decisions with far-reaching concerns to subsequent generations.

A frustrated Spanish official by the name of Tadeo Ortiz wrote to the Viceroy of New Spain.  In his letter, he said:

Most excellent Senor:

The time has come when the Supreme Powers simply must understand that the Comanches, Lipan Apaches, Wichitas, and other small bands of savages have not only hindered the settlement of Texas, but for two centuries have laid waste to the villages and committed thousands of murders and other crimes… These depredations have dressed whole families in black and filled their eyes with tears.  The Government must realize that, with utterly baseless hope and with paralyzing fears, the cowardly governors and ecclesiastical councils have presided over enormous crimes, under the deliberate and infantile notion that someday these barbarians will be converted to the faith and reduced to their dominion. To this perverse view and policy, countless victims have been and are still being sacrificed.

Spain’s presence in the Americas was the effort of a multi-national conglomerate in the same context as the Roman Empire.  The Spanish arrived in the Americas for one purpose: to conquer the indigenous people.  For the most part, they accomplished that mission.  They displaced native populations and immersed them in Hispanic culture and society.  They created new towns, cities, and provinces and incorporated them into the Spanish Empire. Once subjugating natives, the Spanish installed themselves as the social elite, at the head of encomiendas [1]. Overall, it worked out quite well for the Spaniards, as demonstrated by brilliant 17th century societies in Lima, Peru and Mexico City.

The Spanish Empire nearly completed all that it set out to do; it conquered massive territories, vanquished millions of people and reshaped them in Spain’s own image.  The societies they created remain with us today. The Empire of Spain lasted for more than three hundred years.  Its longevity enabled the Spaniards to pass along to all subsequent generations their language, culture, religion, and social structure.

The downside to this story is that in achieving everything previously described, Spain also bequeathed to its successor states lasting problems that originated with Hispanic society itself: it’s social structure, its theory of government, how it distributes wealth, and its relationship to the Church.  Modern Hispanic society maintains many features from the Middle Ages.  Then, as now, Spanish culture was true to its history —able to transmit to others its own unique set of values.

Spain carefully controlled migration from Europe to the World.  It was not the Empire’s intent to colonize the Americas or work the land for its resources.  The Spaniards did intend to subjugate and incorporate others to perform work that they themselves did not want to do.  Seeking to reward Hernan Cortés for his many contributions to the Empire, Spanish authorities offered him vast lands in Cuba.  The generous offer offended Cortes because he had not come to the New World to work the soil as a common peasant.  His reaction is useful because it reveals Hispanic culture and the philosophy governing Spanish conquest.  Most Spaniards expected to live from the labors of their native populations.

The effect of Spanish exploration and conquest was that every place and every person became subjects of the His Most Catholic Majesty, The King of Spain. The system they used to incorporate native populations was the encomienda, a process that inflicted unbelievable cruelty upon indigenous people.  Of course, the Catholic Church never sanctioned Spanish brutality of these inferior people. In fact, the Church worked tirelessly to prevent the wholesale extermination of natives —and yet the Church never protested the mercilessness of Spanish conquest; it would have been alien to the value system of Spanish Catholicism.

Hispanic civilization was (and is) rigidly structured and centralized, but it would be a mistake to say ethnocentrism began with the Spanish Empire.  Besides, Spanish clergy could never have communicated any values that were foreign to Spanish culture.

Encomienda-Hacienda

The Spanish Encomienda

In Mexico [2], the encomienda (later called hacienda) worked brilliantly on the wet and fertile plateaus of older Indian civilizations. By 1575, there were more than 500 encomiendas, each producing massive amounts of annual revenue.  Additionally, Spain operated 320 estates, each yielding to the crown over 50,000 pesos annually.  But as the Spanish conquests worked their way northward, beyond the limits of the Aztecan sphere of influence, haciendas became far less successful.  The problem with these northern efforts, even after they were geographically adapted to include cattle ranches (called Estancia de Ganado), was that Spanish overlords were running short of submissive Indians.  The Spanish officially abolished the encomiendas in 1720, but the massive estates that they created remained —and these became the genesis of social problems prevalent in Mexico today.  Spanish estates fostered but two social classes: at the top, the elite, and below that, everyone else.

Early Spanish colonies in the Americas were part of the “sword and cross” methodology … the embodiment of clerical totalitarianism —albeit without slave masters.  In the success of Hispanicization and incorporation of Indian society, no slave masters were necessary.  What made this scheme impossible on the northern frontier was simply because there were no pliable Indians in Texas.  Noncompliant Indians forced the Church and State to devise new ways of solving their problem.  What evolved from this was the Presidio-Mission system.

Under the Presidio-Mission system, Catholic missions fell within the purview of the religious order, whose responsibilities involved several tasks: incorporate the Indians into the mission structure, Christianize them, teach them how to farm, and teach them obedience.  The presidio fell under the province of the military order whose job it was to defend the religious order and its converts, and to keep the Indians in line. In Spanish, reducidos, or transforming Indian populations into useful subjects of the crown.  The Spanish intended that in time, these Indians would perform the functions of a middle class.  Having been “incorporated,” the natives would build the towns, the towns would become cities, and the cities would evolve into economically viable provinces.  Spanish planners anticipated that such an undertaking might take around ten years —but the first challenge was to find savages who would not object to Spanish brutality. In this regard, Spanish missions were less religious organizations as they were agents of the Crown.

Presidio-Mission 001

Spanish Presidio

Spanish religious councils in Mexico City were proud of their presidio-mission system —and hopeful, because in devising it expressly for its northern territories, the Spanish placed all their eggs into this one basket.  In evaluating the system, we must admit that, from a humanitarian point of view, it was an improvement over Spain’s previous method in dealing with Indians.  While religious councils were excited about its prospects, the Spanish military was not. Soldiers who had faced hostile savages such as the Apache or Comanche could not imagine that such a man would one day become a peasant-farmer.  The ecclesiastics persisted, however, arguing that soldiers always took a cynical view of barbarians.  The clergy believed it was possible to save these Indians and convert them to the work of the Lord (and the Crown).  Experienced soldiers who knew better shook their heads and rolled their eyes.

Still, in one area, the Spanish colonial system of the 18th century was admirable because it was the only system in the Americas that ever envisioned a place for the indigenous populations within western culture —even if that place was at the bottom of the social hierarchy.  Moreover, the presidio-mission system was carefully (although not faultlessly) planned and implemented.  The Spanish put more attention, money, and effort into it than either England or France.  Even so, at is very inception, the Spanish colonial system was a triumph of ideology over reality, predicated on false assumptions and utopian ideals.  No war plan ever survives the first battle.  The problem with Spain’s presidio-mission system was that the Spanish had never encountered Texas Indians.  In time, the Plains of Texas would destroy all of Spain’s hope for the total conquest of the Texas Indians.

Also problematic was the fact that Spain placed too much responsibility on the shoulders of priests and friars.  Yes —they were men of God, but also persuaders, teachers, social stewards, law-givers, land managers, builders of missions, and makers and maintainers of roads.  In its move toward the northern frontier, Spain clearly regarded its priests as the last best hope for these far-off territories.  It was too much to ask.

La Salle 001

Sieur de La Salle

In any case, the first missionary effort in Texas only materialized as a reaction to the encroachment of French explorers, occasioned by the landing at Matagorda Bay of the noted explorer René-Robert Cavelier, Sieur de La Salle [3].  La Salle’s effort, while abortive, did prompt the Spanish into taking a greater proprietary interest in its northern frontier.  Alonso de León [4] responded with a large body of soldiers and priests to establish a permanent colony and halt any further French explorations.

De León constructed a log mission and named it San Francisco de los Tejas (Tejas being the name the Spanish mistakenly gave to the confederacy Indian group called Caddo Hasinai [5]).  They constructed the mission in only three days.  It was situated on the Trinity River, about fifty miles south of present-day Nacogdoches, deep in the pine forests.

Although the Hasinai seldom ventured out onto the western plains, they were by far the most numerous of tribes in Texas.  Comanche and Kiowa occasionally raided the Hasinai, but their large population assured their continued existence.  Conversely, the plains horsemen did not care to place themselves at risk by plunging into dense, dank forests.  Hasinai and Plains Indians lived in completely distinctive worlds.

Hasinai 001

Hasinai Village

The Hasinai were a peaceful people and generously welcomed the Spaniards into their country.  Hundreds lined up to observe Spanish priests dedicate their new mission; many were impressed by Catholic pageantry.  They listened politely to the priests, they offered corn and other foods to the Spanish soldiers, and they promised to give careful thought to the friar’s offer of becoming mission Indians.  Only a handful of Hasinai accepted the invitation.  What may have amused the Indians was the padre’s promise to teach them how to grow their own food.  The Hasinai were already prolific farmers.  In the matter of giving up their warrior culture, these Indians were never hostile except in their own defense.

Hasinai goodwill didn’t last long, though —particularly after Spanish soldiers began fooling around with their young ladies.  Far worse than this were the diseases that quickly spread from the Spanish visitors into local villages.  European sickness had a lethal effect on all American Indians.  Within a short time, scores of Hasinai became ill and died.  Those who were lucky enough to survive began avoiding the mission; the few who had entered mission service soon melted away into the forests.  The friars ordered soldiers to bring the Indians back, of course, but Spanish soldiers (never known for their discipline) had become lazy and ill-disposed toward chasing Indians through the deep forests.  De León’s soldiers were arrogant and insubordinate in their behavior toward their superiors and priests.

Spanish Soldat 001

Spanish Soldat

As the priests and soldiers bickered among themselves, local Indians grew fretful. Spanish pageantry no longer awed them, and they lost all respect for Spanish authority. The Indians began stealing horses and cattle from the Spanish garrison.  The friars believed it was bad enough to have to endure insolence from soldiers; they were determined not to accept it from the Indians.  These circumstances were not a good start for the Spanish Presidio-Mission system.  Without Indians, there was no one to supply food.  It was an untenable situation —and since the French threat had already evaporated, the Spaniards closed Mission San Francisco de los Tejas and marched back to Mexico in 1692. They wouldn’t return to Texas for another twenty years.

It was only French encroachment that caused the Spaniards to return, this time in the person of a French-Canadian soldier/explorer named Louis Juchereau de St. Denis [6].  Inspired less by a desire to explore Spanish lands than by profits from smuggling, this new intrusion stirred Baltasar de Zúñiga y Guzmán [7], 1st Duke of Arión, 2nd Marquess of Valero, Viceroy of New Spain, to reenter Texas.  Once more, the Crown raised soldiers, funded and authorized another mission settlement.  This time, Guzmán was determined that the Crown’s settlement would become permanent.

(Continued next week)

Sources:

  1. Burkholder, M. A. Spanish Empire, Encyclopedia of Latin-American History and Culture, 1996
  2. Thomas, H. Rivers of Gold: The Rise of the Spanish Empire, Columbus to Magellan, New York: Random House, 2003
  3. Maltby, W. The Rise and Fall of the Spanish Empire, London: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2009
  4. Valencia-Himmerich, R. and Joseph P. Sanchez. The Encomiendas of New Spain, 1521-1555: Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991
  5. McKendrick, M. Spain: A History, New York: Horizon Books, Electronic Edition
  6. Phillips, Jr., W. D., and Carla R. Phillips. A Concise History of Spain (Second Edition): Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 2016
  7. Fehrenbach, T. R.Lone Star: A History of Texas and the Texans from Prehistory to the Present: Austin, Da Pao Press, 1968, 2000
  8. Liss, P. K. Mexico Under Spain: Society and the Origins of Nationality, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975

Endnotes:

[1] The system instituted in 1503 granted a tract of land or village (with all its inhabitants) to a Spanish soldier or colonist.

[2] The capital of New Spain was Mexico City.

[3] La Salle was a prolific explorer and trader in North America.  Sieur de La Salle is a French title which means Lord of the Manor.  The French purchased their titles rather than earning them.  In time, his title became synonymous with his person, as if it was his name.

[4] Between 1660-1690, De León led a series of expeditions that traversed the northern coast of New Spain and the banks of the Rio de San Juan.  He was a seasoned outdoorsman and a successful entrepreneur. De León was a logical choice to lead overland efforts to discover foreign interlopers and destroy their colonies.   He led four expeditions between 1686 and 1689.  His initial reconnaissance followed the Río de San Juan to its confluence with the Rio Grande.  After striking the larger river, Don Alonso marched along the right bank to the coast and then turned southward toward the Río de las Palmas (also, the Río Soto la Marina).  This effort yielded no conclusive evidence that Frenchmen had visited the region. His second expedition set out in February 1687.  This entrada forded the Rio Grande, probably near the site of present-day Roma-Los Saenz, and followed the left bank to the coast.  De León then marched up the Texas coast to the environs of Baffin Bay but again found no evidence of Frenchmen.  The third expedition, launched in May 1688, was in response to news that a white man dwelled among Indians in a ranchería (temporary settlement) to the north of the Rio Grande. That effort resulted in the capture of a man called Jean Jarry, a naked, aged, and confused Frenchman.  The fourth expedition left Coahuila on March 27, 1689, with a force of 114 men, including the chaplain Damián Massenet, soldiers, servants, muleteers, and his French prisoner, Jarry.  On 22 April, De León and his party discovered the ruins of a French settlement named Fort St. Louis by La Salle, on the banks of Garcitas Creek. In 1687 De Léon became governor of Coahuila.  Three years later he and Massenet cooperated in founding the first Spanish mission in East Texas, San Francisco de los Tejas, at present-day Augusta, Texas.  De León was an honest soldier and an early pathfinder in Spanish Texas.  He left the region for the last time in July 1690. He was an early advocate for the establishment of missions along the frontier, way marking much of what would become the Old San Antonio Road. He returned to Coahuila and died there on March 20, 1691.  His descendants still reside in the Mexican state of Nuevo León.

[5] The Caddo Hasinai belong to the Caddoan linguistic group, a large family that includes the Arikara, Pawnee, Wichita, Kitsai, and Caddo Indians.  They occupied a compact area in the middle Neches and upper Angelina valleys.  Socially, they were the most advanced and historically important group in the region. The names Texas and Hasinai were interchangeable.  The term Texas or Tejas, was the Indian form of greeting.  It meant “friend.”  The Hasinai had many villages in the vicinity, where they lived in relative comfort, planting corn and vegetables in spring, hunting and fishing in the rich region in other seasons.  The Hasinai lived a secure, almost lazy lifestyle.

[6] We remember St. Denis for his exploration and development of Louisiana (New France) and regions of Spanish Texas.  He commanded the garrison as Fort de la Boulayeon the lower Mississippi River (1700) and founded Fort St. Jean Baptiste de Natchitoches in the area then known as La Louisiana.  St. Denis, who married a Spanish woman, became a thorn in the side of Spanish Texas. There was little doubt in the minds of the Spaniards that St. Denis was an agent of France.  Despite their misgivings about St. Denis, he nevertheless contributed to the geographical knowledge of Imperial Spain.

[7] Served as Viceroy of New Spain from 1716 to 1722 and later served as president of the Council of the Indies.

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The First Americans

Apache 001According to a study conducted by sixty investigators in over 15 countries [1], touted as the most comprehensive survey of genetic diversity of Native Americans, most populations descend from one migration period (although two additional migration periods were also significant).

Referred to as “First Americans” by academics, the earliest migrations began from Asia over a land bridge called Beringia around 13,000 years BC.  Subsequent migrants probably arrived in boats because the land bridge disappeared after the end of the ice age period.  Hence, academics conclude that rather than emerging from a single migration, the ancestors of American Indians emerged from several waves of migration over an extended period of time.  Once here, migratory trends continued as human groups dispersed within the Americas.  This study, by the way, confirmed the hypothesis of a linguist by the name of Joseph Greenberg in 1986.  The study’s conclusion resulted from more than 300,000 specific DNA markers from 52 Native American and 17 Siberian groups: Asian lineage of the First Americans was the oldest, and that Eskimo-Aleut and Na-Dene populations in Canada were more closely aligned to present-day East Asian populations.  Among the Eskimo-Aleut group, fifty percent of the DNA markers can be attributed to the First Americans, while ninety percent the Na Dene Chipewyan group DNA also descends from the First Americans.

We know that the First Americans gradually expanded southward.  We believe it is likely that in their southern migration, they established small tribal bands along the West Coast.  When these bands increased beyond forty or so people, groups split off from one another.  We also believe that after these groups split, there was very little subsequent contact among them.  Again, with time, their languages changed, even if only slightly.  Despite their initial dispersal, there is some evidence of a re-mix in two patterns: north-to-south and west-to-east.  In the former, there were some movements from South America northward (reflected in the DNA of Central Americans).  In the latter instance, some Eskimo-Aleut humans migrated back to Asia.  Despite the fact that this process took thousands of years, languages (with some differences) remained similar.  The development of their own unique cultural morés and folkways was likely dictated by their physical environments.

Apache Buffalo Hunt 001America’s Plains Indians (also, Interior Plains Indians and Indigenous people of the Great Plains and Canadian Prairies) were nomadic hunter-gatherers.  They followed (migrated with) their source of food, the American Bison.  They used these animals to fashion their survival tools.  Indian groups included Anishinaabe, Apache, Arapaho, Arikara, Atsina, Blackfoot, Cheyenne, Comanche, Cree, Crow, Escanjaques, Hidatsa, Iowa, Kaw, Kiowa, Mandan, Metis, Missouri, Omaha, Osage, Otoe, Pawnee, Ponca, Quapaw, Sioux (including Dakota, Lakota, Nakoda, and Nakota), Teyas, Tonkawa, Tsuu T’ina, and Wichita.

The first European to describe these Indians was Francisco Vásquez de Coronadoaround 1541.  It was Coronado who first came across the Querechosin the present-day panhandle of Texas.  He called these people Apachubecause this was the word used to describe Querechos by the Zuni (Puebla) Indians.  In the Zuni language, Apachu meant “enemy.”  By 1620, the Spanish regularly referred to Apache Indians as Apachu de Nabajo(Enemy of the Navajo)—perhaps not realizing (or caring) that there were several Apache bands: Lipan, Kiowa-Apache, Chiricahua, Jicarilla, and Mescalero.  Apache simply referred to themselves as “the people.”

 Historically, the Apache belong to the southern branch of the Athabascan group whose languages constitute a large family with speakers from Alaska, western Canada, and the American Southwest.  Divided into several branches, Apache tribes occupied an area that extended from the Arkansas River to Northern Mexico and from Central Texas to Central Arizona.  Academics generally classify Apache as either Eastern or Western Apaches; the Rio Grande generally served as the dividing line, east or west.  Of the several bands, two lived either partially or entirely within the confines of present-day Texas: The Lipan and Mescalero [2].

The Apache first arrived in the area of the American southwest between 1000 A.D., and 1400 A.D., a migratory process that led them south along the eastern side of the Rocky Mountains.  Eventually, they found their way into present-day Texas, New Mexico and Arizona —a consequence of pressure from stronger Indian groups.  See also: The Comanche.

Apache Attack 001Lipan and Mescalero organized themselves through extended-family groupings.  Several families remained together and consented to the leadership of their most prominent member.  This individual acted as “chief” advisor and director of the band’s activities.  For the most part, the extended family lived in close proximity to each other, which enabled them to unite in times of danger and regularly participate in traditional rites and ceremonies.  Among the Lipan, there was no larger organization than the “band.”  It was a loose organization and one that would lead to problems with the Spanish, the Mexicans, the Texans, and the Americans. One Apache band may have made peace with their enemy; another Apache band would remain hostile.  To the Spanish, Mexican, and Texans —an Apache was an Apache.  If one group made peace and another made war, well … European groups simply concluded that the Apache were untrustworthy.  Over time, the Europeans decided that the only solution to the “Apache problem” was to wipe them out.

Apache bands were patriarchies, but females held a central place within the tribe.  After a ceremonial marriage, the groom moved in with his wife’s family where he served as a hunter and shared in the duties of his father-in-law.  Should the wife die, her husband was required to stay with her family, who would supply him with another wife —likely the sister or a cousin of his first wife. The Apache wife had little obligation to her husband’s family.  Should the husband die, his family might provide the husband’s brother or a cousin as a new husband.  Polygamous marriages did exist among the Apache, but they were rare and mostly confined to prominent members of the village.  Apache men who wanted more than one wife usually married the sisters or cousins of their wives.

As with other Plains Indians, the Apache lived almost completely from the American Bison (Buffalo). They dressed themselves in Buffalo robes, lived in tents made of tanned and greased hides.  When the band moved its location, the tents were carefully folded and loaded onto dogs.  Apaches were among the first to learn to ride horses.  They learned these skills from runaway or captured Pueblo Indians. Indian use of horse was upsetting to the Spanish, who in time forbade the Pueblo from trading with any Apache. Subsequently, no longer allowed to continue traditional trade relationships, the Apache began to raid Pueblo camps and took what they wanted.

Pueblo Revolt 001

The Pueblo Revolt

From 1656 to 1675, the Spanish settlers and Pueblo Indians of New Mexico suffered heavily from almost continuous Apache hostilities.  When added to drought, famine, harsh Spanish rule, and the activities of Spanish missions, it proved too much for the Pueblo Indians and they revolted, driving the Spaniards out of New Mexico in 1680.  By the time the Spanish reconquered New Mexico in 1692, the Apache were a powerful nation of ruthless mounted warriors.  Their power was short-lived, however.

Apache aggressiveness did little more than turn their neighbors into enemies and made them targets of an even greater powerhouse: The Comanche, who along with the Wichita and Tejas Indians, pushed the Apache deeper into the Southwest region of the present-day United States and Northern Mexico.  But the fact remains that the Apache were never able to adapt completely to Plains culture.  They tended to establish rancherias, where they constructed huts and tended fields of maize, beans, and pumpkins.  Tied to their fields during planting and harvesting seasons, their rancherias set them up as easy targets for the Comanche, who were expert at conducting swift and deadly raids, during daylight and at night.  With each assault, the Comanche grew stronger; the Apache grew weaker.

Many Apache groups fled westward into New Mexico and Arizona.  The Lipan and Mescalero tended to flee into the region of present-day Central Texas and Northern Mexico where they collided with the Spanish, who were at the time, moving northward.  Soon after the establishment of San Antonio de Béxar in 1718, the Comanche made their presence known to the Spaniards, but the source of Indian trouble came from the Apache, who found San Antonio a convenient target for raids against their European enemy.  In their naivete, the Spanish pressed for peaceful relations with the Apache and when that didn’t work, they instituted a carrot and stick approach to dealing with them. It must be observed that the Spanish were somewhat slow in their learning curve in dealings with the Indians, but in fairness, the Spaniard’s success with the Jicarilla Apache in New Mexico led them to a false supposition that all Apache were alike, that they were similarly motivated, and at their core, all Apache wanted to achieve peaceful coexistence.

In 1725, the Viceroy of New Spain ordered that a concerted effort be made to establish a peaceful arrangement with the Texas Apache.  In the next few years, there were only sporadic hostilities between the Spanish and Apache, and this led the Viceroy to direct a survey of the Spanish frontier.  Were so many soldiers really needed in these far distant colonies?  Pedro de Rivera y Villalónwas sent to inspect the frontier with a view toward answering this question.  Ultimately, he recommended a reduction in the size of the military frontier garrisons, including at San Antonio de Béxar.  The priests and settlers protested these cutbacks, but to no avail.  In 1729, the Viceroy forbade governors and military commanders from waging war on peaceful or indifferent Indians.

In 1730, a large band of Lipan Apache attacked the settlement at San Antonio killing two soldiers, wounding thirteen others, and stealing sixty head of cattle.  The raid prompted the governor to organize a punitive expedition —a more or less usual Spanish reaction to Indian raids.  The leader of this campaign was Commandante Bustillo y Cevallos, who surprised an Indian encampment west of San Antonio, likely along the San Sabá River (a branch of the Colorado).  The attack resulted in the death of a large number of warriors, women and children. Cevallos claimed that he killed two-hundred Indians, but this was more than likely a gross exaggeration. Moreover, as we shall see, the expedition had no effect on the hostile Apache.

Mission San Lorenzo

Mission San Lorenzo

In 1732, a party of Lipan Apache appeared in San Antonio demanding to speak with the brown-robes (friars); they would have nothing to do with the soldiers.  What they wanted was a mission in their own country, in the area of the San Sabá River.  They claimed to want peaceful relations with the Spaniards.  The padres were overjoyed; the soldiers grumbled, rolled their eyes, and advised caution.  However, nothing could dampen the enthusiasm of these priests and they struggled to develop a plan for Apache missions.  There were several proposals, all carefully considered, and within four years, the first Apache mission was established in Mexico, named Mission San Lorenzo.  It was located 54 miles due-west of the Presidio San Juan Bautista.

Initially, the mission proved successful under the leadership of Father Alonso Giraldo de Terreros, but when he was eventually assigned to other projects a year later, the mission began to fall apart.  Mission neophytes rebelled against the authority of the mission priests, burned the mission, and returned to their homeland.  Naturally, the missionaries blamed the Apache for the failure of the mission, which is partly true.  It is also likely that the Apache rejected the usually harsh treatment of the priests and friars.  The Apache reluctance to move away from their homeland supported additional efforts toward the construction of a new mission closer to Apache territory —called the Apachería.  Convenient, too, it seems, given the Spaniard’s renewed interest in mining in the region of San Saba.

In 1743, Fray Benito Fernández de Santa Anaurged approval for creating missions for the Apache on their own lands.  In his view, this was the best solution to the Spaniard’s most serious Indian problem in Texas.  In 1749, four Apache chiefs traveled to San Antonio with an offer of peace between the Apache and Spanish.  The Apaches, their populations decimated by Comanche raids, finally appeared willing to accept Christian conversion in exchange for their protection by the Spanish military.  Within a few years, Spanish authorities granted permission for the construction of a new Presidio and Mission in Apache country. It would be named San Luís de las Amarillas.  Toward this end, Father Terreros’ cousin, the mining magnate and philanthropist Pedro Romero de Torrerosmade generous contributions to the Franciscan Order in New Spain, including the construction of the new mission.  The initial plan for a mission was expanded to include a frontier (mining) colony and a nearby presidio.

Father Torreros arrived at San Saba in April 1757.  He was under the protection of Colonel Diego Ortiz de Parrilla, who would command the presidio.  The new mission was constructed of logs; it was surrounded by a palisade.  The separate Presidio was constructed a few miles away.  The Parrilla expedition had three tasks: (1) convert the Lipan Apache, thereby removing them as a threat to the safety of Spanish citizens; (2) extend Spanish power and influence into the region west of San Antonio, and (3) investigate claims of vast silver resources along the San Sabá River.  Coronado was not the last man to believe in mythical treasures.

While the Apache had appeared meek enough in San Antonio, in their own country they were dismissive of the Spanish soldiers and priests.  There was never any time for conversion; it was the hunting season. After hunting season, there were other excuses —and yet the padres persisted.  But something was amiss: The Apache were fidgety, and the Spanish couldn’t figure out why.

In fact, the Apache did have something up their sleeve.  Having been mauled by the Cevallos Expedition and shredded by the terrible force of Comanche in the north, the Apache intended to set both of these enemies upon each other.  They had not only lured the Spanish into the Apachería, but also beyond the border of Comanche country, the Comanchería.  The Apache eagerly awaited the Comanche reaction to the presence of these foreigners.

The Presidio-Mission had only been finished for a few months when a friendly Indian brought word to the padres of a terrible calamity in the offing.  Worried, the Spanish sent word to the entire frontier, warning everyone of impending Indian attacks —but nothing happened.  Summer and fall passed without incident; everyone relaxed.  It must have been a false rumor.  These things happened on the great plain.  Winter passed, and with the approach of spring, the grass turned green and lush.  These were the perfect circumstances needed to forage hundreds of horses on the great plain.  In early March 1758, the moon was full and no one in the garrison had ever seen such beauty in the night.  But it was the period known as the Comanche Moon —a time when mounted Comanche could ride at night, unseen by anyone for a thousand miles.

Quite suddenly, every Lipan Apache in the area disappeared.  No one saw an Indian for days, until one morning a rush of horsemen swooped down upon the Presidio.  Sixty head of horse were abruptly gone from the Spanish pasture.  Parrilla put all his men on the walls; he dispatched a messenger asking that the padres join him at once.  They refused.  After a few days, when nothing else happened, Parrilla went to the mission and argued with the priests.  They must, for their own safety, move to the Presidio.  The senior priest, Father Terrerosfinally agreed to join Parrilla the next day even though it was unlikely that “unseen Indians” would wish to do the padres any harm.   Colonel Parrilla detailed seventeen soldiers to remain with the priests and provide them with escort the next day.

Diego Ortiz de Parrilla 001

Diego Ortiz de Parrilla

The Comanche attacked the next morning during mass.  Soldiers ran to the parapet to take up firing positions; Father Terreros and Father Molina followed them.  What they observed was around 2,000 Comanche horsemen surrounding the mission.  Molina was terribly frightened and said as much, but Terreros insisted that these men must be friendly as no Spaniard had done them any harm.  The soldiers awaited the priest’s order to fire, but Terreros would not or could not command it.

 The Comanche warriors were wearing war paint of black and red; they wore headgear of buffalo horn, deer antlers, and eagle’s plumes.  All were armed with lances and bows; five score carried French made muskets. One Comanche dismounted and walked to the mission’s main entrance.  He pushed against the doorway and found it open.  Terreros hesitated, but the Indian did not.  He shoved the door open and quite suddenly, the mission was filled with Comanche Indians.  In sign language, the Comanche ordered the priest to send a message to Colonel Parrilla telling him to open his Presidio to the Comanche.  A large party of Indians took Father Terreros’ hand-written message and rode off.  Meanwhile, another Indian, someone other than a Comanche, had fled to the Presidio to inform Parrilla of these events.  The colonel immediately ordered a detachment of troops to reinforce the mission. These men mounted and rode off —directly into the war party coming from the mission with Toreros’ message.  The Spanish cavalry never had a chance.  In mere seconds, every soldier was killed, save one, who, though badly wounded was able to crawl away.  The Indians scalped every dead Spaniard.

Back at the mission, the Indians were no longer interested in gifts; they would take what they wanted.  As the looting began, frightened priests gathered in the center of the enclosure —but not for long.  Spanish troops inside the mission were the first to die.  One priest was lanced and then decapitated.  Terreros was grabbed and carried off, but before he could be tortured, another Comanche shot him in the head.  Molina was able to break away and, with a few others, hide inside one of the sleeping rooms.  They remained there for several hours.  When the looting and killing was done, the Comanche set fire to the mission and departed as quickly as they had arrived.  Molina was saved by the fact that the mission was constructed of green wood; it would not burn.  After dark, the wounded Molina led a handful of survivors to the Presidio.

Three days later, after scouts reported that the Comanche had left the area, Parrilla and Molina returned to San Sabá.  The remains of Terreros and others were given a Christian burial.  Afterwards, Parrilla gathered his force and withdrew to San Luís and asked for reinforcements.

The destruction of San Sabá caused consternation and rage at San Antonio de Béxar.  Spanish and ecclesiastical authorities strongly believed that the desecration of the mission and murder of priests should not go unpunished, but nothing was done.  After the San Sabá presidio was raided again in 1758, Spanish officials called a conference at San Antonio.  This time, they were serious: they planned another expedition.  All call went out to all other presidios in Texas for soldier reinforcements.  Friendly Indians were recruited to augment the military.  The Viceroy eventually approved the plan.

In August 1759, Colonel Parrilla led six-hundred men with orders to sweep the Indian country north of Béxar.  About a third of his force were Lipan Apache.  He carried two field artillery guns and a supply train to sustain his force for an extended period.  It was the largest Spanish military expedition ever mounted in Texas.  Colonel Parrilla commanded more men than Coronado and Pizarro combined, but he had the good sense not to march his men into the heart of Comanche country.  He instead skirted the Comanchería.  He never met any of the Comanche, but he did locate a Tonkawa village.  At this point, one of two things must become apparent: either the Spanish were intent upon revenge for the death of Father Terreros, or Parrilla didn’t know one Indian from another.  Parrilla attacked the Tonkawa village, killed 55 Indian men and seized more than 150 women and children, who he ordered taken to San Antonio.

In October, Parrilla approached the Red River, the northernmost boundary of Texas.  Here he found more hostiles: Comanche, Kiowa, and Wichita among them.  At the moment Parrilla ordered his assault, the Lipan Apache deserted and ran for their lives. Colonel Parrilla fought his way out of an encirclement, and while his losses were comparatively small (discounting the Indians who ran away), he lost both of his field cannon and his supply train. It was the worst defeat by the Spanish military in the New World [3].

Within a few weeks, Colonel Parrilla reappeared at Béxar.  Casualties aside, Spanish power was dealt an enormous psychological blow. Colonel Parrilla was later court-martialed in Mexico [4].  A French agent working on behalf of the Spanish Viceroy recovered Parrilla’s cannon twenty years later.  Never again did the Spanish authorize a church mission for the hostile tribes of the Texas interior.  Never again did Spain mount a serious campaign against the Comanche.

The Parrilla campaign marked an important shift in the balance of power in Texas.  From 1759 onward, the Spanish adopted a defensive strategy when it came to hostile Indians.  Lipan Apache continued to terrorize frontier communities, the Comanche began to raid and plunder deep inside Mexico, and the Spanish presidios became targets of opportunity and sources of great entertainment for the plains Indian.  Wisely, Spanish soldiers refused to pursue attacking war parties.

Despite the disaster at San Saba and the generally untrustworthy Apache, Spaniards continued their efforts to keep the peace.  The Apache did barely enough to keep the Spanish interested.  Lipan Apache continued to ask for a mission but refused to settle near San Saba.  They wanted a location as far from the Comanche as possible.  A new Apache mission, San Lorenzo de la Santa Cruz, was established near the Nueces River, halfway between San Saba and the Rio Grande. Several bands of Apache visited the new mission, but only about 300 ever settled there.  Within a month, an Apache chief asked for a second mission several miles downstream.  Mission Nuestra Señora de la Candelaria lasted only two years before a smallpox epidemic obliterated the Apache population. Beyond this, the priests themselves were too poor to feed the Indians on a regular basis and demanded too much labor from a physically emaciated people.  The Apache abandoned the mission.  By 1767, there were no Apaches at either of these missions.

Cayetano Pignatelli 001

Cayetano Pignatelli, 3rd Marquis de Rubi, 9th Baron de Llinars

About this same time, Cayetano Pignatelli [5], 3rd Marquis de Rubi, 9th Baron de Llinars, had completed his inspection of the Spanish frontier.  In his opinion, the only reason the Comanche were attacking Spanish settlements is because of their hatred of the Apache.  Since the Spanish had begun catering to the Apache, the Comanche classified Spanish settlements as friends of their enemy.  De Rubi was quite sure that the Spanish could cultivate friendship with the Comanche and enlist their aid in exterminating the Apache. Sr. Pignatelli apparently didn’t know the Comanche.

By the end of the eighteenth century, the Apache had become relatively quiet, with only occasional raids on Spanish settlements.  After the beginning of the Mexican War of Independence in 1811, however, the Apache became bolder in their attacks —attacks that continued until the end of Spanish rule in Mexico and Texas in 1821.  The Mexicans quickly signed treaties with the Apache, promising to provide annual gifts of gunpowder and corn in exchange for peace.  The thought process that went into this arrangement reveals to us the nature of Hispanic culture—but even this wasn’t enough to curb the Apache’s appetite for plunder.  By 1835, frequent hostilities resulted in Mexico offering a bounty for Apache scalps.  Within two years, Apache war parties began attacking Mexican settlements with some regularity, even to the extent of joining up with Comanche war parties.

As Anglo-Americans began moving into Central Texas, the Apache were quick to nurture a friendly relationship and beneficial arrangements for their mutual defense against Comanche raids.  In terms of trade, the Apache found the Texians a dependable market for stolen Mexican horses and other goods [6].  Cordial relations continued after Texas Independence.  A formal treaty after 1838 lasted for several years, but finally broke down around 1845.  At this time, over half of the Lipan Apache band in Central Texas broke off and relocated to Mexico, where they joined with Mescalero in cross-border raids.  Mexico’s government refused to act because their border towns profited from the Apache raids.

When the United States went to war with Mexico in 1846, Apaches provided aid and comfort to the Americans.  By 1856, Apache and Comanche raids into Durango, Mexico had claimed 6,000 Mexican lives, the abduction of nearly 1,000 people, and the abandonment of 358 settlements.

R S Mackenzie 001

Col. R. S. Mackenzie, US Army

Between 1865-1867, Apache depredations resulted in the deaths of 18 Texans and the loss of livestock exceeding $30,000.  Raids continued until 1873 when Colonel Ranald S. Mackenzie led an expedition into Mexico and destroyed the Lipan Apache villages.  Mackenzie either killed or captured virtually every Lipan Apache.  Those who escaped death were deported to the Mescalero  Reservation in New Mexico where many of their descendants remain to this day.

Ultimately, the US-Apache relationship was little improved over that with Mexico.  The influx of gold and silver miners in the Santa Rita Mountains led to an increase in hostilities, often referred to as the Apache Wars.  Previously, the passage of the Indian Removal Act of 1830 marked the beginning of US federal government policy of forcibly removing Indian populations away from white settlements.  Today, many under-educated Americans see these steps as examples of cruelty toward the Indians, but this is a very narrow view.  It is also possible that US officials earnestly wanted to protect the Indians from annihilation at the hands of vengeful whites.  There are numerous examples of Indian depredations between 1800—1870  where literally thousands of whites died, were grievously wounded, raped, and kidnapped by hostiles.  The fact is that Anglo/Indian cultures were so incongruent that there could never have been a peaceful solution to the problem.  The Indians were not willing to give up their land without a fight, and whites, having embarked upon westward migration, were never going to return to the east.  People died on both sides of this issue.

A careful reading of history reveals that white officials gave careful consideration to the Indian problem as evidenced by the Indian Appropriations Act of 1851 and President Grant’s Indian Peace Policy of 1868.  In the former, the US government created Indian Reservations [7]; in the second, Grant sought to avoid violence between Indians and whites.  Grant also reorganized the Indian Service, replacing government officials with religious men who were nominated by their churches, to oversee Indian agencies, to teach Indians the basic tenets of Christianity, and to assimilate them into mainstream American society [8].

Unhappily, President Grant’s policy toward the Indians was a disaster on many levels, not to mention controversial from its beginning.  Reservations were established by Executive Order rather than by acts of Congress.  It wasn’t long before Congress learned of widespread corruption among federal Indian agents; the standard of living within Indian settlements was (and in many cases, continues to be) appalling.

Many tribal leaders correctly observed that Indian relocation and assimilation had but one purpose: to suppress Indian culture.  These leaders either resisted forced removal or, after “surrendering” to federal authority, later escaped the reservation and returned to their old ways.  In both cases the result was more bloodshed.  Two of the more famous of these conflicts was the Sioux War and Nez Perce War, which took place between 1876—1881.  In 1882, President Hayes put an end to the Grant Peace Policy.  We can say with certainty that Grant’s Indian policy was a failure, but we cannot fault the man for trying to find solutions to the volatile relationship that existed between whites and Indians.

As previously demonstrated, the Apache War in the United States was an outgrowth of the much older Apache-Mexican conflict which had been ongoing since around the 1620s. In 1873, the Mexican Army initiated another eradication campaign against the Apache and after months of fighting, both sides agreed to a peace treaty at Casas Grandes in Chihuahua, Mexico.  Having concluded the treaty, the Mexican provided mescal to the Apache and when they became intoxicated killed a few dozen of these men and took the others into captivity.

One of the Apaches who escaped this massacre was named Geronimo [9].  The fact that the Apache were always outnumbered by both the Mexican and US military did little to prevent Geronimo from conducting raids through 1886 and his ability to evade capture made him into a legend.  One particularly odious incident made him “the worst Indian who ever lived.” According to James Haley, a white family had been massacred near Silver City and one young girl was taken alive and then hanged from a meat hook jammed under the base of her skull.  It was alleged that Geronimo’s band of some 38 warriors was responsible for this crime.

In 1875, the US Army forcibly removed an estimated 1,500 Yavapai and Dilzhe’e (Tonto) Apache from the Rio Verde Indian Reservation (consisting of several thousand acres promised to them by the US government) to the San Carlos Indian agency, some 180 miles distant.  It was winter, the rivers were flooded, and among the very young and old, several hundred Indians died.  The Apache who managed to survive the journey were held at San Carlos for 25 years while whites took over their “promised” lands.  Beginning in 1879, an Apache uprising (led by Chief Vittorio [10]) battled the US 9th Cavalry Regiment through 1886.  It took more than 5,000 US soldiers to defeat him.

Geronimo 001During Geronimo’s final period of conflict (1876-1886), he surrendered to the American army on three occasions and accepted life on the Apache reservations in Arizona.  But the Apache were a nomadic people who found life on the reservation confining and lacking in dignity.  American whites might have understood this had they given it much thought.

With the Apache Wars over, the Chiricahua tribe was evacuated from the West and held as prisoners of war in Florida, Alabama, and at Fort Sill, Oklahoma for 27 years.  In 1913, surviving members of the tribe were given the choice of accepting parcels of land in Oklahoma or living on the Mescalero Reservation in New Mexico.  Two-thirds of the remaining tribe opted for living in New Mexico.  Today, the descendants of the Apache number around 100,000.

Sources:

  1. Bannon, J. F. The Spanish Borderlands Frontier, 1513-1821.  New York: Hold, Rinehart, Winston, 1970.
  2. Hyde, G. E. Indians of the High Plains: From the Prehistoric Period to the Coming of Europeans. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1959.
  3. Mails, T. E. The People Called Apache.  New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1974.
  4. Newcomb, W. W. The Indians of Texas.  Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961.
  5. Terrell, J. U. The Plains Apache.  New York: Crowell, 1975.

[1] Coordinated by Professor Andres Ruiz-Linares of the Department of Genetics, Evolution and Environment at University College London and David Reich, Professor of Genetics at Harvard Medical School.

[2] Naming conventions were the product of a nomadic lifestyle.  They were identified as different names by people who observed or interacted with them at different times.

[3] Colonel Parrilla reported that he fought 6,000 warriors under the French flag; he opined that French military officers likely commanded them.  Historians discount Parrilla’s claim; there may have been French agents among the Indians, but there was no evidence produced by Parrilla of a French military operation, nor has there ever been any evidence of a direct participation in the Indian alliance by the French.  It is more likely that Parrilla exaggerated the numbers of Indians and that his claim was made to place his defeat in a better light.  It was one thing to be defeated by other Europeans, another matter to have been routed by savages.

[4] The court-martial didn’t hurt Parrilla’s career; he was later promoted to Brigadier and offered a post with some distinction in his native Spain.

[5] B. 1730. Rubí, who had achieved the high rank of field marshal and knight commander in the Order of Alcántara, arrived at Veracruz on 1 November 1764, as part of the expedition of Juan de Villabla, who had been sent to New Spain to organize regular army and colonial militia units. On August 7 of the following year, King Charles III appointed Rubí inspector of frontier presidios and commissioned him to remedy economic abuses and other urgent matters.

[6] The Mexican government generally overlooked these incursions because the Apache were useful to them against the Comanche.

[7] Indian reservations were generally established on lands unsuitable for farming, and barely adequate for ranching.  When white settlers complained about the size of tracts allocated to Indian settlements, the reservations were arbitrarily reduced in size.

[8] Indian children were forced to live away from their families, forced to wear western clothing, prohibited from speaking in their native language or participating in traditional rites or ceremonies.  Apparently, these “religious men” failed to realize that Spain’s efforts to Christianize Indians over 300 years was an utter failure.

[9] A Mescalero-Chiricahua Apache who lived from 1829-1909.  Geronimo means “The one who yawns.”  He was not an Apache chief, but a leader and medicine man who carried out raids upon Mexicans and Americans between 1850-1886.

[10] Vittorio (1825-1880) was a warrior and chief of the Warm Springs band of the Membreños central Apache (present day Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and the Mexican states of Sonora and Chihuahua).  Victorio was killed by the Mexican Army at Tres Castillos.

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