Introduction

Abraham Lincoln’s election to the presidency had a direction-changing impact on the United States.  The secession of the southern states did very little for Mr. Lincoln’s self-esteem — and here we find another president who was beleaguered for the entire time of his presidency.  Despite his many quotable words, Lincoln was not our best president.  Early in his administration, Mr. Lincoln suspended the writ of Habeas Corpus, which soon resulted in the arrest of one sitting member of the House of Representatives and a third of Maryland’s legislature.  Federal troops arrested Frank K. Howard, a prominent newspaper editor when he criticized Lincoln’s suspension of Habeas Corpus.

Most people consider the American Civil War a series of battles.  It was that, of course, but much more.  It was a politically charged series of manipulations, including the questionable shenanigans of creating a new state so that the federal government could pass constitutional amendments in the absence of eleven other states.

In 1860, a man’s first loyalty was to his state.  That’s how it had always been, even during the colonial period, and if we are honest, that’s how it is now.  We are not United Statesians; we are Texans, Floridians, New Yorkers, and Ohioans.  So, when southern states began to secede from the Union, the men of those states followed their homeland into rebellion.  This explains how Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Lee, U.S. Army became a colonel in the Confederacy.

On 31 October 1860, the strength of the U. S. Marine Corps was 63 officers and 1,712 enlisted men.  After Lincoln called up troops in preparation for war, twenty Marine officers resigned their commissions.  Well, six men left — the other 14 officers attempted to quit but were refused, and they were punitively discharged from the naval service.  Of those twenty, nineteen were company-grade officers.

The Politics of Bleeding Texas

In his 1859 book A Journey Through Texas, author Fred Olmstead observed that the anti-Slavery German minority of western Texas was successfully raising cotton without the use of enslaved people.  Olmstead believed that this example was an opportunity for “free soilers” to save Texas from the blight of human slavery.  Massive migration into Texas, he argued, could be an excellent opportunity to transform Texas into a free state.  Mr. Olmstead was talking to Northerners and German immigrants rather than Southerners.  Regardless, Olmstead’s book prompted much interest in Texas from the northeast.

Pamphleteer Edward Atkinson followed up with a widely distributed tract titled Cheap Cotton by Free Labor.  Northern politicians, after that, seemed to focus their attention on Texas.[1]  But there was another issue: The outbreak of the Civil War brought northern textile manufacturing to a virtual standstill.  By June 1862, roughly 3.2 million spindles of 4.8 million had become motionless.  Not even the Union’s seizure of New Orleans was enough to turn the tide of diminished cotton production, which is why northern politicians directed the attention of the federal military toward Texas.  If the Union could seize Texas and establish the production of free-soil cotton, then much of the North’s economic problems would disappear.

In the fall of 1862, Secretary of War Edwin Stanton appointed Major General Nathaniel P. Banks[2] to organize a southern expedition.  Banks, who began recruiting almost immediately, found it was easy to find volunteers for military service where there was unlikely to be much fighting.  It wasn’t long before General Banks’ orders changed, however.  War planners in Washington decided at the end of 1862 that a better course of action would be to split the Confederacy and restore open shipping on the Mississippi.  Unfortunately, the forces sent to seize Vicksburg found themselves stalemated.  The War Department ordered General Banks to clear the Mississippi before undertaking any other operations.

Northern political and industrial voices continued to clamor for a Texas operation, joined in mid-1863 by the US State Department.  The State Department wanted to send a message to the French, having occupied Mexico, that their further adventures in Mexico (and their alliance with the Confederacy) would not serve their long-term interests.

Major General Henry W. Halleck, then serving as the General-in-Chief of the United States Army, wanted Union forces to attack Texas by way of the Red River, but he left that decision up to Major General Banks.  Banks concluded that the Red River scheme presented too many logistical problems — and he was right about that.  Instead, Banks decided to attack Texas through the Sabine Pass and move his force overland to Galveston.  Banks scheme was defeated by the Davis Guards, a handful of those stubborn Texans previously mentioned.

After four failed attempts to force Texas, Banks finally yielded to Halleck’s pressure and agreed to devise a plan for an advance up the Red River.  For what is was worth, Major General William T. Sherman and Major General Frederick Steele endorsed Banks’ plan, but there were other factors that General Banks had to consider.

First, in 1863, Major General Sherman had yet to distinguish himself as a field commander.[3]  Sherman was beset by hallucinations and unreasonable fears — even to the extent of contemplating suicide.  It wasn’t until after he served under Grant that Sherman finally got ahold of himself.  Second, Major General Steele (who, as a fighting general, was superior to Banks) was also senior to Banks.  It was unlikely that Steele would have been willing to help make Banks successful — and indeed, he did not.

The Campaign

General Halleck’s original concept of the Red River Campaign called for four separate commands to cooperate and coordinate the seizure of Shreveport, Louisiana.  It was Halleck’s “grand strategy” to target four southern cities for capture and subjugation: Richmond, Atlanta, Mobile, and Shreveport.  Halleck believed that the Confederacy could not long survive losing these key cities.  Shreveport was not critical, but seizing that city would at least help placate the yammering voices of northern politicians and industrialists.  More important than revitalizing the cotton industries, though, was that a unionized Louisiana would help Lincoln in his bid for reelection in 1864.

In the prosecution of the Red River Campaign, General Banks would have the direct support of Admiral David Dixon Porter.[4]  Porter’s directive from the Secretary of the Navy was to cooperate with Banks to the fullest extent possible — which he fully intended to do.  In working with Banks, Admiral Porter anticipated the same level of competence that he’d experienced while working with General Grant.  Porter would be disappointed.

Halleck envisioned that Sherman’s army would reinforce Banks and that Steele would maneuver his army from Arkansas against Shreveport from a northern direction.  It was a complicated plan and one that would henge on the willingness of Steele and Sherman to support Banks.  The problem was that General Steele was not disposed to serving under a junior officer, Sherman would not play if he could not command the field, and Halleck would not place either Sherman or Steele under Banks’s command.  Nevertheless, General Banks made a good faith effort to establish a working relationship with Sherman and Steele.

The campaign began well enough.  General Banks ordered his troops on the road from Baton Rouge on 7 March 1864; Admiral Porter moved his rather large flotilla toward the Red River, arriving in Alexandria on 15 March, with Banks arriving eight days later.  General Ulysses S. Grant relieved Halleck as General-in-Chief of the Union Army on 10 March.  Steele ordered his troops on the road almost as soon as he received an order to do so from General Grant.

Banks commanded a force of 30,000 men and 90 field cannons.  Porter’s flotilla included sixty vessels, including thirteen ironclads, totaling 210 guns.  Opposing Banks, Major General Richard Taylor, CSA, commanded two weak infantry divisions and a regiment of cavalry — all together totaling 7,000 men.  Confederate Lieutenant General Kirby Smith intended to support Taylor but was undecided about whether he should attack Steele or Banks.  He ultimately decided on Banks, the larger of the two armies.

From Alexandria, Banks and Porter moved north along the Red River.  Porter’s difficulty (which had always been his chief concern) was moving his ships through the shallow Red River.  General Banks made a fateful decision on 3 April to leave one infantry division behind to protect Porter’s rear echelon fleet.  His second mistake was that in marching toward Shreveport, he moved his force away from the river toward Pleasant Hill and Mansfield.

On 8 April, Banks led his army directly into Taylor’s waiting force.  When Banks failed to attack, Taylor led an attack against Banks at a time when the federal troops were on the road in marching formation.  Taylor drove the Yankees into a panicked retreat with heavy losses.  Taylor renewed his assault the next day, but by then, the tide had turned.  Banks had weathered the worst that Taylor had to offer but lacked the confidence to continue his mission.  Instead, he withdrew to await the return of Porter’s upstream fleet.  In doing so, Bank handed the initiative to the Confederates.

General Steele was outnumbered and short on supplies.  He extricated himself from the engagement and returned to Little Rock.  Taylor’s remaining force harassed Bank’s army as it returned down the Red River.  Admiral Porter’s fleet was in danger of being lost because it could not navigate past Alexandria.  With the help of army engineers, Porter did manage to escape, but not without significant harassment from Taylor’s rebels.  In total, Banks suffered 5,400 battle casualties; Porter lost 9 ships, and General Taylor gave up 4,300 men out of his force of 9,000.

The Red River Campaign officially ended on 22 May 1864.

Conclusion

The story of the Red River campaign is one about young men doing their level best to carry out their orders and a chronicle of serious mistakes by their field generals, whose incompetence resulted in the unnecessary death or injury of the soldiers entrusted to their care.  The operation was ill-conceived.  Not even the Confederate command structure could believe that Banks had undertaken such a campaign.  General Banks repeatedly violated the principle of mass by failing to synchronize his power.  He also failed to provide security for his force, which allowed the Confederates to surprise him while on the march.  It would have also been a good thing if General Banks knew how to read a map.

Even though General Banks had embarked upon an offensive, he failed to retain the tactical initiative.  At both Mansfield and Pleasant Hill, General Banks allowed his enemy to dictate the engagement’s pace, time, and location.  At no time did General Banks achieve surprise — nor even attempt it.  Worse than this, however, General Banks’s battle plan was unclear and overly complicated.  One might say that Banks was lucky not to have lost more men.  The Red River Campaign was one of the few military operations lost by the side with the most men and resources.  

Sources:

1. Wynn, D. T. The Red River Campaign of 1864.  Newport: Naval War College, 1994.
2. Jones, J. P. and Edward Keuchel. Civil War Marine: A Diary of the Red River Expedition, 1864.  Washington: Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1975.

Endnotes:

[1] The described situation may explain why Texas became the focus of the most extraordinary punishments during Reconstruction.  Texas had become a “disappointment” to the northern abolitionists; if they were not enlightened of their own volition, they must be forced into it.  What stood in the way of Texas enlightenment was their stubbornness.  No one will cause a Texan to do anything, evidenced by the racial strife that continued in Texas through the mid-to-late 1960s.

[2] Banks was a millwright by trade, former governor of Massachusetts, and former speaker of the US House of Representatives.  Banks was one of Lincoln’s political generals, which made him unpopular among the Union regulars.  In the field, he didn’t fare well in his contest against Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah, so he was sent to replace Benjamin Butler at New Orleans.  Banks failed to reinforce Grant at Vicksburg and failed to force Fort Hudson to surrender until after Vicksburg had fallen.  Nathaniel P. Banks was many things, but a good general was not one of them.

[3] See also: Civil War in Louisiana by John D. Winters.

[4] Son of Commodore David Porter, cousin of Major General Fitz J. Porter, and half-brother to David G. Farragut.

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